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ABSTRACT 
The elevated levels of violence seen recently in Mexico are not a sign of a worsening 
security situation as the media would lead one to believe. Instead, they give witness that 
the Government of Mexico has implemented an unparalleled offensive against the deadly 
drug cartels. Despite the unprecedented assault against the cartels, cartel prevalence and 
violence is increasing when it should be decreasing. Drawbacks, such as widespread 
corruption within Mexican public agencies, have provided cartels with the flexibility to 
avoid functional elimination. The inability of the Government of Mexico to address the 
problem of corruption effectively not only undermines the state‘s actions, but also 
encourages cartel influence. Similarly, Colombia has struggled against powerful drug 
cartels and other nefarious entities for nearly 60 years. Whilst the Government of 
Colombia struggled to target the criminal organizations, it was forced to tackle 
corruption, lack of security and other factors. The causal symptoms of Colombia‘s 
problems, while not identical to Mexico‘s, share several similarities identified through 
case studies and center of gravity analyses. Ultimately, lessons learned from Colombia‘s 
experience are scrutinized to determine their suitability for application in Mexico‘s war 
against its powerful cartels. 
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A. THE PROBLEM AT HAND 
Mexico‘s cartels have been in existence for decades and have earned vast profits 
from any and every means of trade available, including the primary feeding of the United 
States‘ insatiable hunger for illicit drugs.1 The U.S. government estimates that anywhere 
from 50 percent–70 percent of the illegal narcotics that enter the United States do so 
through Mexico.2 Competition amongst the different cartels has created a turf war as they 
battle for control over the rights to this lucrative market and the violence resulting from 
these wars has been steadily increasing for many years. While most of the cartel violence 
is targeted at competing cartels, this violence has also been taking its toll on ordinary 
citizens in Mexico. For example, on March 17, 2011, police in Acapulco found the body 
of a 4-year-old child who had been shot in the chest. Several days earlier, three others, 
including a woman, her two-year-old and six-year-old grandchildren were also gunned 
down inside their home. Within the same week, two 15-year-olds were shot at on separate 
occasions. Also during this same week, the Guerrero state police found a body near an 
Acapulco prison. All of these killings were part of the steady increase in local cartel 
violence since the 2009 slaying of the Beltran Leyva cartel‘s leader, Arturo Beltran 
Leyva.3 
The death toll of Mexican citizens caught within the cross hairs of the warring 
cartels has risen to over 35,000 since 2006.4 These deaths are attributable largely to the 
cartels and to a smaller degree to human rights violations by Mexican security forces. 
Ciudad Juárez, a Mexican city separated from El Paso, Texas by the Rio Grande, is 
                                                 
1 The United States is the world‘s largest consumer of narcotics. 
2 Kevin A. Self, Counterterrorism Policy in Colombia (Master's thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007), 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA473382. 
3 Sergio Flores, ―5th Child Victim Killed in Mexico Drug Violence,‖ News, msnbc.msn.com, March 
10, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42138870/ns/world_news-americas/. 
4 Ibid. 
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currently a hotbed for cartel activities. To put it in context, the drug cartel wars in Ciudad 
Juarez claimed the lives of more civilians in 2010 than the entire civilian death toll in 
Afghanistan since 2001. In 2010 alone, Juárez experienced 3,111 civilian murders 
compared to Afghanistan‘s 2,421 civilian casualties. In other words, one out of every 427 
civilians in Juárez is killed compared to one out of every 12,029 civilians in 
Afghanistan.5 
The elevated levels of violence seen recently in Mexico are not a sign of the 
worsening security situation, as the media would lead one to believe, but instead 
demonstrate that the Government of Mexico (GOM) has implemented an unprecedented 
counter cartel offensive. According to FBI testimony given to the U.S. Congress in May 
2010, drug related violence in Mexico falls into three wide-ranging categories: intra-
cartel violence occurring amongst cartel affiliates, inter-cartel violence occurring between 
rival cartels and cartel against GOM violence and vice versa.6 While the GOM is 
executing their extraordinary assault against the cartels, cartel prevalence should be 
diminishing while security should be increasing, but this is not the case. Drawbacks such 
as widespread corruption within Mexican public agencies have provided cartels with the 
necessary flexibility to avoid functional elimination. The inability of the GOM to 
effectively address the problem of corruption not only undermines the state‘s actions, but 
also encourages cartel influence.  
1. Conventional Wisdom 
Countless scholarly opinions have been published as to why Mexico is 
experiencing a notable increase in cartel related violence. According to a Master‘s thesis 
written by Mexican Naval Officer, Lieutenant Commander Alfonso Reyes-Garces, 
Mexico‘s government remains one step behind the cartels for two reasons, (1) Mexico‘s 
history of government corruption, and (2), the ineffective measures of success in its anti-
                                                 
5 Edwin Mora, ―One U.S.-Mexico Border Town Had More Civilian Casualties Last Year Than All 
Afghanistan,‖ News, cnsnews.com, March 3, 2011, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/one-us-mexico-
border-town-had-more-civil. 
6 Anthony P. Placido, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control 
(Washington, DC: FBI, n.d.). 
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drug policies. He states that, from the early 20th up to the 21st century, complex social, 
economic and political processes have shaped Mexico‘s drug trade. Although the 
Mexican government has aggressively fought the cartels, their efforts have been centered 
on repeating ―forward assault‖ actions and attempts to ―decapitate‖ the organizations by 
arresting its leaders, which has not worked as effectively as hoped. While the Mexican 
government is acting on old policy, the cartels are modifying their organizations, their 
relation to the state, and to the public in an effort to adapt more quickly than the 
government.7 Reyes-Garces also notes that the Mexican Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) 
is the only government entity that has set goals in the fight against the cartels, but the 
goals are supply based and only address a superficial portion of the problem. For 
example, in 2007, some of SEDENA‘s goals were to execute ―28 high-impact eradication 
operations per year‖ and ―reduce by 70 percent‖ the total surface area of illegal crops 
planted in Mexico. While these goals seem ambitious, the total surface area of illegal 
crops grown in Mexico is currently unknown. In other words, while the total number of 
illegal crop destructions can be measured, effectiveness on the overall drug trade cannot 
be measured because the baseline is unknown; therefore, the efforts of SEDENA cannot 
be accurately validated.8 
While supply and demand based theories certainly play into the drug problems 
plaguing Mexico, another broader set of theories holds strong arguments as well. Some 
critics are proponents of harm-based theories that center on the actual drug trade market. 
These theories include the demand for the market and the public services, such as police 
forces and justice systems, designed to deter people from participating within the illicit 
market. Mexico expert Colleen Cook states that the Mexican President's National Drug 
Control Strategy for 2007 declares that the GOM is following a balanced drug strategy 
that focuses on prevention of drug use, treatment, and disrupting the illicit drug market. 
In the last five years, significant achievements have been made in reducing youth use of 
LSD, Ecstasy, and methamphetamine. The GOM maintains that domestic and 
                                                 
7 Alfonso Reyes-Garces, Winning the War on Drugs in Mexico? Toward An Integrated Approach to 
the Illegal Drug Trade (Master's thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 33–39, 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA514370. 
8 Ibid., 39. 
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international law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking not only disrupt the drug 
supply, but also are key to combating the corrosive impact of the drug trade on societies 
and governments.9 However, despite all these aggressive policies towards a balanced 
anti-drug strategy, drug cartel activity is on the rise. 
The preceding studies highlight a common theme that targeting the drug supply is 
not the most efficient policy for attacking the drug trade. The studies also suggest that a 
harm-based policy is more effective at diminishing the drug trade. These themes are in 
line with and further support the hypothesis of this thesis, that corruption is a central 
inhibitor for the drug trade in Mexico.  
Similarly, Colombia has struggled against powerful drug cartels and other 
nefarious entities for nearly 60 years. Whilst the Government of Colombia (GOC) 
struggled to target the cartels, it was also forced to tackle the corruption, lack of security 
and other factors similar to the GOM. The causal symptoms of Colombia‘s problems, 
while not identical to Mexico‘s, shared several similarities examined further during the 
Case Studies conducted in Chapters III and IV. Ultimately, lessons learned from 
Colombia‘s experience are examined to determine their suitability for application in 
Mexico.  
2. Cartels As Organized Crime Syndicates 
While examining drug cartels, it becomes evident that the nature of these 
organizations most clearly resembles organized crime syndicates, such as a Mafia family, 
rather than other anti-law organizations, such as a terrorist or insurgent group. Similar to 
an insurgent or terrorist organization, cartels endeavor to maintain a stranglehold on both 
the local population and its governing bodies; however, in contrast to an insurgent or 
terrorist group‘s political aspirations, cartel goals are purely financial—more akin to an 
organized crime syndicate.  
                                                 
9 Colleen W. Cook, CRS Report for Congress: Mexico’s Drug Cartels (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, October 16, 2007), 20–21, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. 
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To further understand a drug cartel or organized crime groups, a clear 
understanding of an organized crime syndicate should be developed. In 1983, organized 
crime expert Frank Hagan wrote that ―analysis of criminology literature indicates that a 
large number of works including textbooks, fail to offer a clear definition of organized 
crime.‖10 Despite this failure, the 1967 U.S. Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime 
Report offers the following description: ―organized crime is a society that seeks to 
operate outside the control of the population and its government.‖11 Noted author 
Howard Abadinsky proposes a definition in his book, Organized Crime, ―organized 
crime is a non-ideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social 
interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the 
purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.‖12 
Organized crime scholar Joseph Albini says that organized crime is ―(1) the use of force, 
intimidation or threats of such, (2) the structuring of a group or organization whose 
purpose is that of providing illicit goods and services, and (3) providing legal and 
political forms of protection that assure its operation.‖13 
For the purpose of this thesis, the previous definitions are combined to create an 
overarching definition of an organized crime syndicate as it applies to a cartel. 
―Organized crime is an organization that operates on a hierarchical basis, using both legal 
and illegal activities to seek profit, while using force, intimidation, and coercion to 
operate outside the control of the population and its government.‖ The qualities of this 
definition are further applied in the case studies conducted on Mexico and Colombia in 
Chapters III and IV. 
Also of importance to this thesis is how closely corruption factors into the 
operations of organized crime syndicates. Without the existence of corruption, organized 
                                                 
10 Frank E. Hagan, ―The Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of a New Conceptual 
Model,‖ Criminal Justice Review 8, no. 2 (Fall 1983): 52. 
11 Joseph L. Albini, ―Donald Cressey‘s Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime: An 
Evaluation,‖ Crime & Delinquency 34, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 338. 
12 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990), 8. 
13 For more information on the Patron-Client model, see Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 25; Albini, 
―Donald Cressey‘s Contributions to the Study of Organized Crime,‖ 338. 
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crime syndicates could not prosper. According to organized crime and corruption 
scholars, Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, the indices of organized crime, corruption 
and violence were compared across 70 countries, and the results pointed to a high 
correlation of interconnectedness in all 70 case studies.14 Corruption and organized crime 
syndicates are symbiotic in that both help each other to not only exist, but also to thrive in 
any environment. Corruption, therefore, is the main focus of this thesis and how it 
directly facilitates the operations of cartels. 
3. Root of the Problem 
The supposition of this thesis is that the chief contributor to the success and 
survival of the Mexican cartels is cartel influence, specifically through corruption. The 
Mexican judicial system, especially at the local district level, is widely corrupted and is a 
key component of the cartel problem requiring immediate reform. Not surprisingly, Latin 
American expert and author Stephen Morris attributes the lack of progress in Mexico‘s 
battle against the cartels directly to the shortage of accountable institutions to combat 
corruption;15 but more interestingly, he also suggests that change will not be successful 
until the Mexican people truly desire and work together towards reform.16 Similarly, 
Professor Leonarda Reyes states ―reform has been unsuccessful in Mexico because there 
has been no national reflection, no revising of moral values and ethics to build a new and 
better Mexico.‖17 Therefore, the fight against organized crime syndicates will never be 
won unless the GOM and its citizens reject the historic and pervasive culture of 
corruption present in their society. This thesis considers reforms that the government of 
Mexico can implement to curb the corruption that permeates every facet of life in 
Mexico. 
                                                 
14 Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, ―Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public 
Sector,‖ in Forum On Crime And Society, vol. 3 (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2003), 5–6, www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3.pdf. 
15 Ibid., 240. 
16 Stephen Morris believes that all the anti-corruption laws implemented in Mexico will remain 
incapable of combating corruption until Mexican society embraces anti corruption as part of its culture. 




The research approach for this thesis utilizes case study comparisons between 
Mexico and Colombia, as well a center of gravity (COG) analysis to determine the true 
root of the problem and the actions required to defeat or minimize it. A COG analysis 
will be conducted on each case to evaluate the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the 
government‘s ability to target vulnerabilities. Specifically, the COG analysis examines 
the history of the cartels, focusing on their activities, sources of income, actions taken by 
their respective governments to combat the cartels, and finally, what has and what has not 
worked. 
The purpose of the case studies is to examine the history of each country‘s 
struggles against violent antagonist organizations, such as cartels, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (FARC), 
and paramilitaries independently. The Colombian case study provides several examples 
of successful policies that if tweaked, may be implemented with success in Mexico. The 
similarities between the two countries, discussed in the following paragraphs, provides 
initial justification for comparing Mexico to Colombia instead of one of the many other 
Latin American countries currently struggling with organized crime. 
1. Background Comparison of Mexico and Colombia 
While many, including Mexican President Felipe Calderón and U.S. President 
Barack Obama, argue that one cannot compare what is happening in Mexico today to 
what happened in Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s,18 many similarities between the 
countries make further exploration worthwhile. However, the basic characteristics of both 
Colombia and Mexico, which ultimately have shaped their cultures, common thought 
process, and political policies towards outside influence, are shown to share a rather close 
likeness. However, random parallels alone do not justify comparing the two in an attempt 
to find a solution to Mexico‘s dilemma. The research for this thesis compared many 
facets of both countries in an attempt to justify whether Colombia were a good fit to 
                                                 
18 William Booth, ―Mexico‘s War Compared to Insurgency,‖ News, The Washington Post, September 
9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/08/AR2010090807134.html. 
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compare with Mexico. The comparison between Mexico and Colombia is not a perfect 
fit, but enough evidenced similarities exist between them to take some lessons learned in 
Colombia for Mexican adaptation and implementation. 
Since most narcotics production largely occurs in South America, Mexico is 
currently experiencing a significant amount of violence attributable to the cartels vying 
over control of the lucrative smuggling market. In response, the Mexican government has 
deployed tens of thousands of troops and Federal Police to combat the cartels, but the 
violence has worsened. Drug related murders remain in the hundreds every month and the 
cartel members have stepped up the frequency and brutality of their attacks.19 Similar to 
the current struggle in Mexico, the conflict in Colombia has been a turf war between 
criminal organizations. The GOM is currently targeting its cartels in a similar fashion to 
the manner in which the GOC did. However, the GOM has failed to set the conditions 
necessary to take on such a monumental task; effectively, implementing reform aimed at 
weeding out corruption within the security forces and the justice system. If those items 
are not addressed efficiently, then the military operations have been conducted in vain.  
After the big cartels were taken down in Colombia and new problems arose, the 
GOC would finally embrace a more effective strategy called the ―whole of government‖ 
(WoG) approach. The Colombian government‘s strategy was to take back areas 
controlled by cartels and other criminal organizations and to replace their influence with 
improved social programs. The Colombian government knew they could not completely 
eradicate the criminal organizations; instead, they sought to keep them on the run and 
make life so miserable for them that they would want to quit and re-integrate into 
society.20 
It is evident that the Mexican government must adopt a new strategy if its fight 
against the cartels is to be successful. As the following chapters show, Colombia 
experienced problems similar to Mexico‘s and continues to battle an ongoing insurgent 
                                                 
19 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (London: Transaction Publishers, 
2009), 1-7. 
20 Garry Leech, Beyond Bogota: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2010), 110. 
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movement that has taken over the drug trade from the big cartels. However, despite the 
fact that Colombia‘s problems are not over, the reality remains that the government of 
Colombia, through its actions, was able to turn the tide on the cartels and reduce 
corruption that was threatening the country‘s stability. Those successful actions are what 
this thesis endeavors to dissect and apply to Mexico‘s current dilemma. 
The following paragraphs highlight that many similarities exist between 
Colombia and Mexico besides their individual cartel problems. They include each 
country‘s topography and geography, economy, culture of corruption, military and law 
enforcement systems, and finally their cartels. It is important to note that Colombia and 
Mexico also have some important differences, which are also discussed below.  
a. Geographic and Topographic Comparison 
One important difference between Colombia and Mexico is their 
geographies. Geography determines agriculture, population density, transportation 
methods and access to intended markets, specifically, as it applies to this thesis topic, the 
United States. Mexico, at over 1.94 million square kilometers of land, contains more than 
830,000 square kilometers of land than Colombia. According to photius.com, Mexico and 
Colombia rank as the 17th and 28th largest countries in the world by land area, 
respectively.21 More land suggests that that Mexico is capable of supporting a larger 
population. It also presents a greater challenge for policing and internal control. 
Mexico boasts 9,330 kilometers of coastline, ranking 21st amongst the 
world, whereas Colombia‘s coastline is considerably smaller. Having a significantly 
larger coastline means that Mexican cartels have a greater opportunity to ship illicit 
goods via maritime routes to any point on the United States‘ 19,924 kilometers of 
coastline. The Mexico-United States border ranges 1,951 miles, which is moderately 
guarded by fences, cameras and roving patrols. Consequently, Mexican cartels have a  
 
 
                                                 
21 Leech, Beyond Bogota. 
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geographic advantage and many more methods of moving their illicit goods to their 
consumers in the United States than the cartels of Colombia in the early 1980s through 
the late 1990s.  
Another key difference between Mexico and Colombia is that of 
topography. Possessing both coastline and the northern tip of the Andes Mountain Range, 
Colombia has a much larger range of elevation going from sea level up to mountains that 
reach to just under 19,000 ft. Between the three mountain ranges in Colombia, lay plains, 
as well as vast uninhabited and largely inaccessible portions of the Amazon jungle.22 The 
inaccessibility and remoteness of these regions make them ideal for drug production, as 
well as hiding places for cartels and FARC. While Mexico also has a high rising 
mountain chain, a central plateau that averages between 4,000 and 8,000 ft. dominates 
most of its topography. Mexico is mostly arid desert with only one major river, the Rio 
Grande.23 Therefore, far less regions of Mexico are inaccessible to government forces. 
The differences in topography between Mexico and Colombia also determine what types 
of illegal agriculture the countries are capable of producing. 
b. Economic Comparison 
Mexico is predominantly a service-based economy. According to the 
United States Department of State, 64 percent of Mexico‘s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) derives from its service industry, including commerce and tourism, financial 
services, communication and transportation. Only 4 percent of Mexico‘s $1 trillion GDP 
in 2010 came from agriculture. Mexico exported $230 billion of goods or services in 
2009. Of the $230 billion of exports, $185 billion or 80 percent went to the United States. 
Mexico is the world‘s sixth largest producer of petroleum products; other natural 
resources include precious metals, natural gas and timber.24 According to the United 
Nations‘ 2009 World Drug Report, Mexico is also a growing producer of marijuana, 
                                                 
22 Encyclopedia of the Nations, ―Colombia - Topography,‖ Nations Encyclopedia, n.d., 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/Colombia-TOPOGRAPHY.html. 
23 Ibid. 
24 ―Background Note: Mexico,‖ U.S. Department of State, n.d., 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm. 
 11 
opiate based drugs and methamphetamines. More specifically, the report states that in 
2007 alone, marijuana seizures in Mexico represented 39 percent of the world total. 
Nearly 98 percent of the opiates found in the United States originated in Mexico and 
Colombia with close to 75 percent of that total coming from Mexico. Finally, Mexican 
cartels are believed to own and operate more than twice as many meth labs as what is 
currently believed to exist in the United States.25 
Colombia‘s economy, while also service industry dominated, is much 
smaller and slightly more agriculturally based. Sixty-four percent of Colombia‘s $140.8 
billion GDP is from its service industry including construction, transportation and 
government spending. Eight percent of this GDP is derived from agriculture while only 
8.2 percent of Colombia‘s land is dedicated to agriculture. On these lands, Colombians 
grow bananas, coffee, cut flowers, tobacco, and sugar cane and as discussed later, as well 
as other illicit crops including the coca, poppy and marijuana.26 In summary, tourism 
represents a significant portion of Mexico‘s economy, which boasts a GDP almost ten 
times greater than that of Colombia, while Colombia is far more dependent on agriculture 
and far less on tourism than Mexico.  
c. Culture of Corruption in Latin America 
Often described as ―a violation of the norms of public office for personal 
gain,‖ corruption is a common theme in many parts of the world.27 However, in Latin 
America, the subject is as synonymous to the region as apple pie is to the United States. 
Since the release of their first Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995, Transparency 
International has continually found that Latin American countries are among the most 
corrupt in the world.28 To illustrate the problem further, a survey conducted in seven 
Latin American countries (including Mexico and Colombia), by the European Values 
                                                 
25 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010 (New York: United Nations, 
2010), http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Joseph S. Nye, ―Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,‖ American 
Political Science Review 61, no. 2 (June 1967): 417–427. 
28 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009 (London: Pluto Press, 2009): 2, 
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Study Group and World Values Survey Association (EVSG and WVSA 1995–1997), 
found that a large majority of citizens considered ―almost all‖ or ―most‖ public officials 
to be corrupt. Only in Uruguay and Chile did a majority claim that ―few‖ were corrupt.29 
According to the same source, more than 70 percent of the Mexican population taking the 
poll thought that its own government had high levels of corruption. 
The origins of corruption in Latin America seem to have its roots in the 
legacy of corruption left by colonial Spaniards in practically every one of their former 
colonies years prior to the arrival of democracy to the region.30 Historical analyses 
conducted by Burkholder and Johnson (1994), Ewell (1977), Gibson (1966), Hopkins 
(1974), McFarlane (1996), Nef (2001), Posada-Carbó (2000), Phelan (1960), and 
Whitehead (2000) have all found that corruption in Latin America dates to the colonial 
period.31 Therefore, democracy did not create corruption; instead, democracy brought to 
light the pre-existing culture of corruption when citizens began demanding transparency 
and accountability from their governments.32 Nowhere has this been more evident than in 
                                                 
29 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009, 2. 
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Mexico, where according to Latin American political scholars Charles Blake and Stephen 
Morris, the prevalence of corruption encompasses nearly every facet of daily life.33  
Corruption scholars Kathleen Bruhn and Michael Tangeman argue that 
corruption in Mexico today is largely a result of 71 years of hegemonic dominance by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI).34 During 
those years, the PRI maintained an oligarchy where the president and his closest allies ran 
the country largely unchecked by the legislative, judiciary and other branches of the 
government. The result was the systematic corruption of nearly every government, state 
and local agency in the country. Shady and blatantly corrupt practices became the norm 
when accomplishing even the most mundane of tasks.35 Mexico‘s government did not 
experience significant pressure to reform while the PRI remained in control of the 
government. This dynamic changed in 2000, however, with the election of President 
Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN). 
Similarly, Colombia has also struggled with corruption throughout its pre 
and postcolonial history. Claims abound that drug cartel money has funded presidential 
campaigns, and by the late 1980s, it is believed that the combined profits of the cartels 
equaled over 30 percent of Colombia‘s GDP,36 which made nearly every politician or 
government official susceptible to corruption.37 However, the concerted effort placed on 
professionalizing the country‘s security forces along with the successful efforts to purge 
them of corrupt officials ultimately helped greatly in reducing cartel influence in the 
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security forces. Most importantly, it aided tremendously in gaining the support and 
approval of the population.38 While corruption is still a problem in the government of 
Colombia, the country‘s security forces now are the standard bearer of low corruption 
when compared to other agencies within their government and even other Latin American 
nations.39 The methods used to reduce corruption are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
d. Military Comparison 
During President Andres Pastrana‘s term (1998–2002), the Colombian 
military began a series of aggressive reforms that increased professionalization and 
capabilities. According to Colombia expert Thomas Marks, this reform was necessary 
due to internal dislocation caused by the growing drug trade, U.S. government sanctions 
being placed on Colombia from inadequate Counter Narcotics (CN) cooperation, and 
mediocre senior military leadership.40 This reform, focusing primarily on the Columbian 
Army (COLAR), revitalized the military education system, turning lessons learned into 
operational and organizational modifications and developing sound NCO leadership to 
enhance small unit performance. Simultaneously, attention was given to human rights 
instruction, information warfare, and joint and special operations.41 
Colombia‘s military spending has been rapidly increasing since the early 
2000s. Colombia‘s security forces number 435,000 including 285,000 military personnel 
and 150,000 police forces. According to the World Bank as of 2009, Colombia was 
spending 4.1 percent of its GDP on defense, which is a testament to the government‘s 
dedication towards national security.42 Colombia‘s Ministry of Defense maintains a close 
relationship with the United States and continues to develop these ties by sending its 
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military personnel to the United States for training or by hosting American personnel in 
Colombia to provide military assistance programs, international narcotics control 
programs, and foreign military sales.43 An example of the close Colombia/U.S. anti-drug 
cooperation is Plan Colombia, a program designed to maximize cooperation and 
assistance in critical areas of promoting peace, counternarcotics operations, human rights 
awareness, improved social programs and other programs to stimulate the Colombian 
economy.44 As part of the program, the United States funds, trains and equips a brigade 
of COLAR personnel in CN tactics. The United States has equipped this brigade with 
more helicopters than the entire compliment of the COLAR inventory. However, the 
legislation outlining Plan Colombia allowed for only the eradication of drug production, 
which placed operational and geographic limitations on Plan Colombia‘s capabilities.45 
By contrast, Mexico spends approximately 0.5 percent of its GDP on its 
national security.46 Its armed forces total 225,000, which combines the Army and Air 
Force into one autonomous service comprising 75 percent of that total. The Mexican 
Navy is a separate entity that has its own cabinet agency and chief of staff. Mexican 
police forces consist of 450,000 personnel and are divided into federal, state and 
municipal roles. These police forces are further divided into two groups, preventive and 
judicial police. Preventive police are in charge of good order and do not investigate 
crimes, while the judicial police perform the remaining duties. Both groups are subject to 
monumental levels of corruption. In fact, President Calderon, on 10 occasions, has 
deployed his military into different districts to relieve the weak and corrupt state and 
municipal police forces.47 While Mexico is seeking to make reforms to its police forces, 
this process is only initializing and still has much room for growth. 
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While Colombia has a close relationship with the U.S.‘s military, Mexico, 
on the other hand, has a less cooperative relationship with the U.S.‘s military that is in the 
process of improving. According to United States Air National Guard Lieutenant Colonel 
Andrew Salas, ―a shared hostility exists between the Mexican and U.S. militaries that is 
deeply rooted in a history of military intervention by U.S. forces in Mexican affairs, not 
the least of which was the expansion of the United States westward at Mexico‘s territorial 
expense and various interventions culminating with General Pershing‘s brutal expeditions 
in the early 1900s.‖48 Despite this history of hostility, progression towards a better 
relationship between the two militaries has begun. According to a USA Today News 
source, the United States approved $1.3 billion in aid for Mexico‘s war on drugs. 
However, the Mexican government is believed to have wanted this cooperative deal in 
order to avoid a higher level of negative press.49 In the same article, Mexico‘s limited 
military-to-military cooperation with the U.S. is further highlighted by the fact that only a 
small number of U.S. military members are allowed into Mexico per year on a training 
advisory status. This small number constitutes 20 teams of one to five members per 
year.50 
e. Cartel Comparison 
The cartels of Mexico and of Colombia have many similar operational 
characteristics. Most important, all cartels functioned as individual organized crime 
syndicates fighting for control over illicit markets. While all the cartels share common 
modes of operation, some differences do exists between the Mexican and Colombian 
cartels that should be noted. The first difference between the cartels of both countries is 
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50 Michaels, ―U.S. Military Works with Mexico to Fight Drug Traffickers.‖ 
 17 
the numbers of cartels present. During the early 1980s to mid-1990s, the government of 
Colombia primarily battled three major cartels operating within its borders, the Medellín, 
Cali and the Valle del Norte cartels. However, the two most powerful were the Medellín 
and the Cali cartels. Mexico, on the other hand, currently has seven active cartels of 
varying degrees of power. They include the Gulf, Sinaloa, La Familia, Los Zetas, Juárez, 
Tijuana and the Beltran-Leyva cartels. 
Another difference between the cartels in Colombia and Mexico are their 
respective sources of revenue. Colombia‘s cartels were drug manufacturing and 
distribution organizations. During their zenith in the early 1980s to their decline in the 
late 1990s, they were the principle producers of cocaine in the world and ranked as one of 
the biggest exporters of heroin.51 While Colombian cartels dominated the cocaine 
manufacturing industry, Mexican cartels are currently involved in the production and 
trafficking of methamphetamines, marijuana, and heroin, in addition to cocaine. Mexican 
cartels are also involved in human and arms trafficking, auto theft, and kidnapping. 52 
According to illicit drugs author Michael Lyman, the primary source of the U.S. 
methamphetamine production shifted throughout the 1990s from outlaw motorcycle 
gangs to Mexican cartels operating out of Mexico and California.53 Lyman further 
elaborates on Mexico‘s drug production capabilities by saying that Mexico is the U.S.‘ 
primary producer of marijuana and grows almost 50 percent of the marijuana consumed 
in the country.54 While Mexico produces most of the U.S. methamphetamine, marijuana 
and heroin supplies, Colombia remains the world‘s largest producer of cocaine, followed 
by Peru and Bolivia.55 
The levels of power also differentiate the Mexican and Colombian cartels. 
During their height of power, the Colombian cartels dominated the cocaine production 
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markets of South America and had their own modes of transportation and distribution for 
their drugs into the United States. Following a concentrated effort by the U.S. 
government to shut down trafficking routes in and around Florida and the Caribbean, 
coupled with the demise of the cartels due to successful operations by the government of 
Colombia, Mexican cartels were allowed to take complete control of transportation and 
distribution markets. While cocaine production still continues in South America, Mexican 
cartels now transport 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States.56 Mexican 
cartels today have more power and influence than the Colombian cartels had during their 
last years in power because of the size of the market available to them. Mexican cartels 
are further empowered by the Mexican government‘s failure to implement adequate anti-
corruption initiatives accompanied by low levels of government transparency.57 
2. Center of Gravity Analysis 
In his book, On War, Carl von Clausewitz states that a center of gravity (COG) is 
―the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which 
all our energies should be directed.‖58 Contemporary definitions have elaborated further 
on this ―hub‖ and U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency refers to a COG as ―the source 
of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.‖59 
U.S. Military Joint Publication 3.0 elaborates this definition further to represent: ―the set 
of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its 
moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.‖60 These definitions make 
evident that the COG is the principle target on which to focus, but determining what  
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exactly is an adversary‘s COG it is not as clear-cut as assumed. Success depends on 
understanding the specific characteristics of the COG and knowing where and how to 
best attack the adversary. 
A COG exists because of the critical capabilities (CC) it possesses, which are vital 
to the adversary‘s survival. Each CC has several critical requirements (CR) that provide 
the channels through which the CCs operate. Since attacking a COG directly may be 
impossible or perhaps too costly, it is preferable to attack the COG through its critical 
vulnerabilities (CV), see Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.   Attacking a Center of Gravity through its Critical Vulnerabilities. 
U.S. Military Joint Publication 5-0 defines a CV as ―an aspect of a critical 
requirement, which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create 
decisive or significant effects.‖61 When considering what CVs to attack, it is essential to 
scrutinize the CCs and CRs they support to ensure the target vulnerability will have a 
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direct effect on the COG, as well as its capabilities. Attacking insignificant vulnerabilities 
merely for the sake of attacking them offers no substantial benefit in the long run. 
Attacking critical vulnerabilities, albeit small but focused on weakening the CC, is far 
more effective at making the adversary‘s COG collapse.  
The principle idea behind the COG Analysis is that, once the problem is 
understood well enough, a strategy for attack becomes self-evident. In the case of 
Mexico‘s drug cartels, the goal should not be to attempt to attrite or decapitate them, but 
instead to eliminate certain key elements that will incapacitate them systematically. To 
accomplish this objective, it is necessary to understand how they operate, what keeps 
them in business and from where their strength derives. Once understood, the appropriate 
course of action emerges intuitively and the process of generating multiple courses of 
actions becomes largely unnecessary. The case studies and COG analyses used in this 
thesis aims to accomplish this goal. 
3. Conclusion 
This thesis strives to offer a stimulating new answer to an old problem. 
Specifically, a COG analysis of Mexican cartels aims to answer the following questions: 
(1) What is the problem? (2) What is the preferred outcome? (3) Where must energy be 
focused to achieve the preferred outcome? (4) What is the general plan to achieve the 
desired outcome? While the methodology utilized in this thesis answers the questions 
listed above, the most difficult task is the GOM‘s implementation of these findings. 
Having determined that Mexico‘s cartels are most similar to organized crime 
syndicates and resemble those faced by Colombia, the next task is to examine these 
organizations to find their COGs. The root similarities and differences between Mexico 
and Colombia provide a great starting point for identifying policies that minimize 
corruption, and ultimately, cartel violence. With an established beginning, the focal point 
of this study can turn to the believed culprit: corruption including its types and effects. 
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II. WHAT IS CAUSING THE VIOLENCE? 
Con dinero baila el perro… 
Sin dinero uno baila como perro. 
[With money the dog dances… 
without money, one dances like a dog.]62 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 2011, Mexican authorities ordered the arrest of over 115 ex-
municipal employees from the Mexican gulf coast state of Veracruz. Of those arrested, 
over 30 were former mayors who were charged with embezzling over 67 million pesos 
($5.5 million) by siphoning money from public works projects in their municipalities 
between 2004 and 2008.63 In mid-November 2009, the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released a report ranking countries around the world 
by levels of corruption. Mexico dropped 17 spots from the 2009 list and was ranked the 
89th most corrupt country out of 180 countries polled. Mexico‘s CPI number in 2009 was 
a 3.3, and the average number for the rest of the world was a 3.963. In other words, 
Mexico has a higher level of corruption than the global standard. Professor Lena 
Wängnerud elaborates further by stressing that data collected by both Transparency 
International and the World Bank since the mid-1990s consistently portray Mexico as ―a 
highly corrupt state.‖ See Figure 2, Levels of Corruption in Mexico (1995–2009).64 
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Figure 2.   Levels of Corruption in Mexico (1995–2009)65  
Observations: The charts illustrate levels of corruption in Mexico as perceived by its citizens. ―Both 
sources define corruption as the exercise of public power for private gain.‖  
 
Top Chart: Corruption Percentage Index–(CPI) Represents data collected by Transparency 
International regarding corruption as perceived by professionals, such as businessmen, researchers and 
scientists in Mexico from 1995–2009.  
Legend: 0 = highly corrupt, to 10 = highly clean.  
 
Bottom Chart: Control of Corruption–(CC) Represents data collected by the World Bank based on 
numerous sets of data also intended for measuring perceptions of corruption.  
Legend: -2.5 = highly corrupt, to 2.5 = highly clean. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze corruption, which this thesis 
hypothesizes is a critical requirement for the Mexican cartels and can be reduced by 
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better social and institutional reforms. For that reason, Mexican corruption is the primary 
focus of this chapter since the intent of this thesis is to determine how to minimize 
corruption in Mexico to defeat the criminal organizations responsible for countless illegal 
activities. The review of corruption includes its origins, types, symptoms and effects, 
which should lead to a better understanding of the culture of corruption present today in 
the Mexico. A thorough understanding of corruption, coupled with the case studies 
presented in the following chapters, help identify a viable strategy the Mexican 
government can implement to eliminate or reduce the rampant corruption that has 
allowed the violent drug cartels to operate largely with impunity.  
B.  BROAD LOOK AT CORRUPTION  
Numerous types of corruption exist including public, private, economic, 
institutional, academic, judicial, and political to name a few. Acts of corruption may also 
be categorized by type as well. Furthermore, economic gain is not the only motivation for 
corruption; a variety of different motives for corruption exist, some of which include 
increased status or power, addiction to drugs or gambling, sexual gratification, as well as 
economic gain.66 For the most part, corruption is most often viewed as bribery, nepotism, 
fraud, laundering and embezzlement inside of public institutions.67 In 2009, the United 
Nations convened a convention against corruption in New York City. The purpose of this 
convention was to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and fight corruption, and 
promote international cooperation and accountability in the management of public affairs 
and public property.68 One key preventative measure recommended by the convention to 
the international community is the establishment of an independent organization 
dedicated to investigating corruption within each country‘s law enforcement agencies.69 
In U.S. law enforcement agencies, these organizations are called Internal Affairs and are 
                                                 
66 Seumas Miller, ―Corruption,‖ n.d., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/corruption/. 
67 Ibid. 
68 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), 7, 
http://www.unicri.it/documentation_centre/publications/series/docs/Technical_Guide_UNCAC.pdf. 
69 Ibid., 9. 
 24 
charged with ensuring adherence to agency rules and standards while also investigating 
charges of misconduct among the agency‘s members. In the U.S. military, these 
organizations are commonly known as the Inspector General and are charged with similar 
duties. As discussed during the Mexican case study, Mexico is lacking in this endeavor. 
The UN convention also included other activities, such as money laundering, position of 
trust abuse, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, concealment, and obstruction of justice as 
the over-arching issues associated with corruption.70 
C. HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN MEXICO 
Often described as ―a violation of the norms of public office for personal gain,‖71 
corruption is a common theme in many parts of the world. According to Mexican 
political scholars Charles Blake and Stephen Morris, the prevalence of corruption in 
Latin America encompasses nearly every facet of daily life.72 In addition, while both 
declare that corruption is not a recent phenomenon in the region, they emphasize ―the 
arrival of democracy to Latin America in the 1980s is responsible for spotlighting the 
problem of corruption due to increased citizen demand for accountability and 
transparency from the government.‖73 Many, who have studied the history of corruption 
in Mexico over the past century, including authors Kathleen Bruhn and Michael 
Tangeman, share their assertion. Bruhn and Tangeman claim that corruption in Mexico 
today is largely a result of 71 years of hegemonic dominance by the PRI or the 
―Institutional Revolutionary Party.‖74 During those years, the PRI maintained an 
oligarchy where the president and his closest allies ran the country largely unchecked by 
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the legislative, judiciary and other branches of the government. The result was the 
systematic corruption of nearly every government, state and local agency in the country. 
Shady and blatantly corrupt practices became the anticipated norm when accomplishing 
even the most mundane of tasks.75 Mexico‘s government did not experience significant 
pressure to reform while the PRI remained in control of the government. This dynamic 
changed in 2000, however, with the election of President Vicente Fox.  
The election of President Fox and the PAN or ―National Action Party,‖ 
effectively ended the PRI‘s 71-year reign over the country. With the PRI out of the 
driver‘s seat, and the government progressively moving towards democracy since the 
1980s, the country began to see the implementation of administrative reforms aimed at 
combating corruption.76 Yet, despite that, many had expected and hoped for a significant 
decline in corruption, but the population would not see the changes it was anticipating. 
As previously mentioned, this lack of change is a direct result of the lack of responsible 
institutions held accountable for ensuring reform measures are not only implemented, but 
also enforced. Ultimately, the Mexican government must take the steps necessary to 
encourage a social awakening of sorts aimed at embedding in the population a true 
intolerance and disgust for corrupt public officials and corruption as a whole. This task 
while daunting is achievable as long as the government does not regress to the ways of 
the past and enforces the reform measures. 
D. PREVALENT TOOLS OF CORRUPTION IN MEXICO 
Authors Blake and Morris argue, ―corruption is associated with such dominant 
issues today as the weak rule of law, the security crisis, the lack of democratic deepening, 
the crisis of political representation, the issue of accountability and democratic 
consolidation.‖77 Moreover, while the Mexican government has undoubtedly taken 
numerous steps towards reducing corruption over the last decade, nothing appears to 
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work indefinitely. Whereas, the government has tried purging police forces of corrupt 
police, these attempts are only temporary solutions and corruption ultimately reenters the 
ranks. In 2009, all 1,142 traffic policemen in Monterrey were pulled off duty for 
corruption tests. More than 270 failed and were dismissed, followed by a further 250 
being told that they were ―overweight‖ and dismissed.78 Another example of police 
purging is the 2007 purge of the federal police chiefs of all 31 states of the Mexican 
Federal District.79 So how are the ranks corrupted again? Corruption does not begin at the 
police chief level in Mexico but actually reaches the levels of the political elites.80 The 
case study of Mexico in Chapter III further identifies corruption related reforms the 
Mexican government is currently implementing.  
While a difference certainly exists between perceived and actual corruption, many 
people fail to make the distinction regularly. Scholars, such as Davis et al, 2004, and 
Canache and Allison, 2005, have conducted numerous studies exploring this topic.81 
Interestingly, they concluded that ―women, older respondents and people with greater 
levels of political interest tend to perceive higher levels of corruption than do others; in 
contrast, males and individuals from higher income and education brackets are more 
likely to be involved in corrupt activities or be victims of corruption.‖82 Of the many 
prevalent tools of corruption in Mexico, as noted by corruption scholar Michael Johnston, 
bribery, nepotism, official theft, and fraud, as well as conflict of interest, are noteworthy 
to examine.83 The following paragraphs define the previously mentioned requirements 
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for corruption and provide examples of how and when they occur.84 Note, the following 
is not intended to be an all-inclusive or all-encompassing list of corrupt activities in 
Mexico but, instead, provide the reader an idea of the challenges faced by Mexicans 
every day.  
1. Bribery  
Bribery is the most widespread tool of corruption in Mexico because practically 
every type of corruption revolves around having to bribe someone to obtain what is 
needed. Whether it be a driver‘s license, a building permit, or even for a police officer to 
do his job, Mexico tops the list of places worldwide in which a bribe is required to 
receive even the most basic of public services.85 The most common type of bribe is 
referred to as ―la mordida‖ or ―a bite.” Sadly, many government officials expect to 
receive a mordida for simply doing their job. In her paper, ―Variation in Corruption 
between Mexican States,‖ Lena Wängnerud provides a colorful anecdote from an 
interview with a Mexican police officer: 
All of us take mordidas—100% of us, says the Mexican police officer 
Antonio Martínez in an interview, and he continues: Maybe not all the 
time. Maybe one time in 10. It buys lunch for the day.86  
While most Mexicans complain about the mordidas, it is widely accepted as the 
price for getting things done.87 A 2005 survey conducted by Transparency International 
concludes that over 31% of Mexicans acknowledged having paid a bribe within the last 
12 months.88 Whereas, in the United States, a politician might be bribed with campaign  
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contributions with hopes of swaying a vote; in Mexico, customs and immigration 
officials, police officers and even judges expect a mordida in exchange for providing the 
services they were hired to provide.  
2. Nepotism 
Another common tool of corruption in Mexico is nepotism, which is most often 
seen as public officials appointing friends or relatives to positions within their 
organizations over better qualified persons, which is rarely done free of charge. Often 
referred to as a ―plaza‖ or assignments, most public officials are forced to pay bribes in 
exchange for being hired or to hold a particular plaza.89 The bribes are usually recurring 
and much higher than the official salary provided by the government. Thus, the employee 
has little option but to resort to corrupt practices to both pay the plaza costs, and to earn a 
living. For example, if a police officer desires to work in a particular neighborhood, he 
must pay his police supervisor a bribe in exchange for that neighborhood or plaza. The 
price depends on the earning potential in that particular plaza by extorting businesses, 
and residents, as well as the criminals and cartel members wishing to do business in that 
neighborhood.90  
The following is a depiction of a typical day in a police officer‘s plaza: a criminal 
has burglarized a local business and has remained in the neighborhood. The business 
owner approaches the local police officer and informs him of the crime and that the 
criminal is still nearby. The police officer is uninterested in arresting the criminal because 
he extorts him in exchange for allowing him to burglarize the local businesses. The police 
officer tells the business owner his shift is almost over and that he must get going. The 
business owner pleads with the police officer to make the arrest but the police officer is 
resolute about doing nothing. Finally, the business owner offers the police officer a bribe 
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in exchange for arresting the criminal or essentially doing his job (the first mordida). The 
police officer happily accepts the bribe, proceeds to the corner and apprehends the 
criminal. The police officer, not wanting to be the one to press charges against the 
criminal instructs the business owner to file formal charges against the criminal at the 
local court. The police officer takes the criminal to jail then stops in to see the judge and 
pays him a bribe in exchange for releasing the criminal (the second mordida). The judge 
agrees, accepts the mordida and later, during the criminal‘s arraignment, declares that 
sufficient evidence to charge or hold the criminal has not been presented, and orders the 
criminal set free. The criminal, upon release, returns to the neighborhood, pays another 
bribe to the police officer for getting him out of jail (third mordida), and then proceeds to 
vandalize the business owner‘s place of business in retaliation for having him arrested. In 
the end, the only person who loses is the business owner. Figure 3 illustrates the cycle.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Cycle of Corruption in a Neighborhood Plaza 
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3. Official Theft and Fraud  
This tool of corruption refers to the unauthorized use or sale of government 
property by either government officials or private citizens. An example of fraud is a 
public official, usually an agency supervisor or director, placing fictitious employees on a 
payroll. The obvious goal is for those corrupt officials to pocket the salaries of ―ghost‖ 
employees. While this may seem like a less significant form of corruption, it is very 
successful at lessening the public‘s confidence and trust in the government‘s ability to 
manage its own assets. As stated by Blake and Morris, ―impunity towards corrupt public 
servants further degrades the legitimacy of the state.‖91 Studies conducted by Bardham, 
Brunetti and Weder, and Djankov et al. show that a direct connection exists between 
―regulatory burden, red tape, low salaries, high discretion levels, opaque bureaucracies, 
and a limited rule of law to corruption.‖92 
4. Conflict of Interest 
After reviewing the tools of corruption previously mentioned, it is not difficult to 
understand how corrupt government officials create conflicts of interest by the very 
nature of their corrupt activities. In theory, a conflict of interest is a competition of 
interests between the interests of the individual and those of the organization this person 
is entrusted to protect. Every public official who accepts a bribe or mordida is guilty of 
this conflict of interest, and the public knows this. Nieto argues, ―the population must be 
convinced that corruption can in fact be fought effectively in order for things to 
improve.‖ Thus far, the Mexican government has failed to do so.93 
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In 2003, just three years after the PRI was voted out of office, Transparency 
International conducted a study, which found that despite the creation and 
implementation of numerous anti-corruption laws in Mexico by President Fox‘s 
government, government transparency had not reached the levels many had expected.94 It 
could be argued that the previously mentioned study was conducted too soon after PRI‘s 
departure for notable improvements to take hold. Latin American political scholar Strom 
Thacker supports this hypothesis by stating, ―while democracy tends to lower corruption 
in the long run, in the short term it virtually has no impact.‖95 
Thus, what options are feasible for the Mexican government? Mexican politics 
expert Strom C. Thacker stresses that ―governmental and nongovernmental accountability 
mechanisms including: an independent judiciary, a well-paid civil service, a media sector 
able and willing to conduct investigative journalism on corruption, and a set of interest 
groups dedicated to the reduction of corruption is a critical step towards reducing 
corruption.‖96 So far, the Mexican government has not been able to achieve those goals. 
The judiciary is largely corrupt, journalist are harassed and even killed if they bring 
certain corruption to light and the interest groups are also largely corrupt and self-serving. 
Therefore, the police forces must be effectively purged of corrupt officials and anti-
corruption measures must be effectively implemented to prevent them from falling prey 
to corrupt practices again. This step requires significant reform, which is discussed in 
detail in later chapters. Only an honest and capable police force can earn the respect and 
support of the population. As mentioned earlier, social change is a prerequisite to reform. 
Popular attitudes must shift from acceptance of corruption and skepticism towards the  
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government to respect for the rule of law, intolerance of corruption and a demand for 




III. CASE STUDY: MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS AND 
CORRUPTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The cartels of Mexico have a history tied closely to drug trafficking that has 
endowed upon them the ability to assert influence throughout Mexico and much of the 
Western Hemisphere. This influence, based on financial capital and the ability to deliver 
violence, allows the cartels to conduct business with little fear of reprisal from Mexican 
authorities, the population or rival cartel members. To develop a clear picture of what 
comprises cartel influence, this thesis examines the history of the cartels, their 
capabilities, and the activities in which they are most commonly involved. Next, the 
Mexican government‘s actions are examined to determine what impact anti-drug policies 
and reforms implemented to date have had on cartel capabilities. Finally, a center of 
gravity analysis is conducted to illustrate the root problem facing Mexico today. Through 
this case study, it will become apparent that Mexico has initiated many policies and 
reforms geared towards taking down the cartels in hopes of reducing violence while 
ineffectively addressing intangible social issues, and more specifically, corruption within 
the law enforcement agencies, which is a critical capability of the cartels and goes hand-
in-hand with levels of violence.  
B. HISTORY OF THE CARTELS IN MEXICO 
Drug cartel expert Malcolm Beith argues that Mexico‘s modern drug cartels were 
formed in 1987 by Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo 
who controlled all illicit drug trade in Mexico and transportation of drugs into the United 
States. Known as ―The Godfather,‖ Felix Gallardo became so powerful that he divided 
the different corridors of Mexico amongst his top drug lords. The Tijuana route went to 
the Arellano Felix brothers and would become the Tijuana Cartel. The Ciudad Juárez 
route went to the Carrillo Fuentes family, which established the Ciudad Juárez Cartel. 
Miguel Caro Quintero ran the Sonora corridor, but this cartel would later split into the 
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Sinaloa and Tijuana Cartels. The control of the Matamoros Tamaulipas corridor was 
delegated to Juan Garcia Abrego and would become the Gulf Cartel. Joaquin Guzmán 
Loera and Ismael Zambada Garcia took control of Pacific coast operations and formed 
the Sinaloa Cartel. Félix Gallardo retained authority over the entire country but did not 
interfere with the cartel‘s daily business.97 
With the formation of the initial cartels, decentralized command and control over 
Mexican narcotics trade operations was intended to increase efficiency and decrease the 
risk of the drug lords being arrested. Since their inception, alliances between the cartels 
have led to hostility and infighting, and alliances have also caused powerful cartel cronies 
to split from their parent organizations and form new cartels. For example, Los Zetas ran 
the Gulf Cartel, founded by Arturo Guzmán Decena in 1999,98 but in 2010, they split 
from the Gulf Cartel and became enemies of their former employer.99 La Familia Cartel 
and Los Zetas shared a similar beginning, as La Familia was the paramilitary wing of the 
Gulf Cartel. They trained with Los Zetas, but after their split in 2006, La Familia became 
enemies to both Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartels.100 The last large-scale cartel in existence 
today is the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, which was formed by Marcos Arturo, Carlos, Alfredo 
and Héctor Beltrán-Leyva in 2008 after a split with the Sinaloa Cartel. They were top 
men in the Sinaloa Cartel under Joaquin Guzmán, and after the arrest of Alfredo, Arturo 
ordered the assassination of both the commissioner of the Federal Police and the son of 
Sinaloa Cartel leader Guzmán. A 15-man hit squad killed the son of Joaquin Guzmán, 
and understandably, this caused a huge rift between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán-
Leyva brothers, forcing the brothers to create their own cartel.101 These alliances and 
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splits formed the primary cartels in operation today: Gulf, Sinaloa, Tijuana, Los Zetas, La 
Familia, Beltran-Leyva and Ciudad-Juarez. Figure 4 is an illustration of the territory 
controlled by each cartel and the disputed area over which they are fighting. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Mexican Cartels‘ Areas of Influence102 
1. Sources of Income 
While drug production and trafficking comprise the lion‘s share of the Mexican 
cartels‘ income, they also find other sources to fund their activities, such as human 
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trafficking, kidnapping and piracy. Although money laundering is not a great contributor 
to cartel income—its primary function is simply to conceal the source of illicit income—
cartels do find some marginal income by laundering foreign illicit money, such as 
Colombian drug money. Mexico expert and U.S. Congress advisor Colleen Cook 
estimates that Mexican cartels launder annually anywhere from $8.3 to $24.9 billion of 
both Mexican and Colombian drug money.103 Another source of income is piracy. For 
example, La Familia has been selling pirated copies of Microsoft software and can earn 
as much as $2.2 million per day.104 
Human trafficking and kidnapping compose a larger portion of cartel income, but 
still does not compare to the income that illicit drugs garners. The kidnappings of 
Americans, Mexican officials and migrants can net extortion fee of $200 up to 
approximately $85,000. From April through September of 2010, over 11,333 migrant 
kidnappings were reported,105 an increase from the 1,600 migrant kidnappings reported 
from September 2008 through February 2009.106 Not all reported cases result in extortion 
profit for the cartels; however; some kidnapping victims join the cartel ranks, while 
others are used as drug mules and others are simply executed.107 Overall, human 
trafficking is the second largest source of income for the Mexican drug cartels, which 
supplies them with $15 to $20 billion annually.108  
The chief source of financial income for the cartels is their production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs. Mexico is the primary producer of methamphetamines and 
marijuana and 90 percent of the cocaine used in the United States is trafficked through 
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Mexico. Through drug production and trafficking, Mexican cartels generate an estimated 
$35 to $45 billion annually, with an 80 percent profit margin.109 Control over this 
immense, highly profitable market drives brutal competition between the seven major 
cartels.  
2. Activities 
In addition to income generating operations, cartels perform other activities that 
primarily support cartel operations, which include weapons smuggling and intimidating 
the Mexican population. Weapons smuggling is not a great source of income for the 
cartels, but smuggling allows the cartels to obtain weapons easily and cheaply from gun 
shops in the United States or from weapons traffickers in Guatemala. It is worth noting 
that most of the smuggled weapons are not obtained from the United States; in fact, 90 
percent of all the smuggled weapons enter Mexico through Guatemala.110  
Public intimidation is also a major cartel activity. Public intimidation can occur in 
many forms, but perhaps the most effective tactic is the targeting of innocent civilians 
and public executions. A 2011 video of a man being castrated and decapitated provides 
an example of the public displays of violence and intimidation of the population.111 
These videos are intended to intimidate rival cartel groups, Mexican public officials, 
police forces and the Mexican public. The problem with this tactic is that it generally fails 
to incite true intimidation in rival cartel members. Instead, the rival cartel will seek 
revenge, which thus perpetuates this cycle of violence. To break this cycle of violent 
public executions, either a dominant winner must emerge or a ceasefire must be reached 
between the cartels and the Mexican government.112 
                                                 
109 Devon Duff and Jen Rygler, ―Drug Trafficking, Violence and Mexico‘s Economic Future,‖ 
Knowledge Wharton, January 26, 2011, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2695. 
110 EFE, ―Mexican Cartels Get Heavy Weapons from CentAm, U.S. Cables Say,‖ Text. Article, Fox 
News Latino, March 30, 2011, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/03/30/mexican-cartels-heavy-
weapons-centam-cables-say/. 
111 Smurf, ―Narco Execution Videos and Their Effects on the General Population,‖ Borderland Beat, 
March 8, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/03/narco-execution-videos-and-its-effects.html. 
112 Smurf, ―Narco Execution Videos and Their Effects on the General Population,‖ Borderland Beat, 
March 8, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/03/narco-execution-videos-and-its-effects.html. 
 38 
Another cartel-employed method of controlling the population is targeting 
innocent citizens with violence. For example, children have become an intentional target 
of violence. Historians of the Mexican drug-trafficking culture say that, until recently, 
children were considered off-limits in the code honored by crime bosses, who used to 
portray themselves as Robin Hoods dealing dope to gringos and donating alms to the 
poor. However, beginning around 2006, this attitude changed. The Children‘s Rights 
Group estimates that 994 Mexican people under the age of 18 have been killed between 
2006 and 2010, but this figure is underestimated because Mexican media outlets are 
highly susceptible to cartel intimidation.113 
The cartels are not just operating within Mexico. According to the LA Times, 
cartels have begun to create and operate distribution centers throughout the United States 
as well.114 In April 2011, federal law enforcement officers raided a house in Columbia, 
South Carolina occupied by a member of the Sinaloa Cartel. Within the house, authorities 
found 10 kilos of cocaine worth over $350,000. The LA Times also identified Atlanta as a 
major cartel hub for the storage and distribution of drugs to smaller cities throughout the 
Southeast. Other U.S. cities named as having cartel influence include the Tijuana Cartel 
operations in Seattle, WA, Juárez Cartel operations in Minneapolis, MN and Gulf Cartel 
operations in Buffalo, NY.115 Mexican cartels are also operating across the border in 
Guatemala. Los Zetas Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel have made their presence known by 
recruiting Guatemalan military members and low-level Guatemalan criminals. Since the 
assassination of Guatemalan drug lord Juan Jose ―Juancho‖ Leon in 2008, the Los Zetas 
Cartel has controlled all cocaine trafficking within the area of Guatemala.116 
                                                 
113 Anne-Marie O‘Conner and William Booth, ―Mexico‘s Drug Cartels Have New Target: Children,‖ 
The Irish Times, April 12, 2011, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2011/0412/1224294477784.html. 
114 Richard A. Serrano, ―Mexican Cartels Setting Up Shop Across U.S.,‖ Los Angeles Times (Los 
Angeles, April 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/17/nation/la-na-crack-house-20110417. 
115 Ibid. 
116 ―Official: Mexican Cartels Hiring Common Criminals,‖ Fox News, April 6, 2011, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/06/official-mexican-cartels-hiring-common-criminals/. 
 39 
3. Political Connections 
While cartels do not exhibit strong political agendas, other than combating anti-
cartel policy, they do need the connections within local and state governments to 
maintain political invulnerability. According to law enforcement official and scholar John 
P. Sullivan and Red Team Journal editor Adam Elkus, cartels, such as La Familia are 
building social services and infrastructure protection in rural areas and small towns to 
build a social base from which to increase their influence within communities. In urban 
areas, they are funding political patron-client relationships—reinforced by corruption, 
propaganda, political marches and demonstrations to help shape future conflicts in their 
favor.117 This tactic is a common strategy amongst criminal syndicates, such as the 
American mafia. Without these connections to political figures, police officials or social 
figures, the crime syndicates would be completely on their own, depending on what 
limited resources were available. In other words, without these connections, no inside 
man would be able to forewarn them of coming threats or to provide advice on prudent 
action.  
4.  Ability to Corrupt 
Mexican cartels are responsible for corrupting officials at all levels of Mexican 
government, the military and police forces. Steven David, a renowned authority on civil 
conflict, highlights cartel dedication to corruption by arguing that the Arellano brothers 
―invested‖ over $75 million yearly towards the corruption of local, state and federal 
officials.118 This corruption is not limited to Mexican government institutions but also 
includes the United States and neighboring Central American countries, such as 
Guatemala. An example of higher-level government corruption is shown in 2008: a 
Mexican officer attached to President Calderón‘s guard staff was arrested for leaking 
information to the cartels in exchange for bribes and also training hit men through a 
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private security firm and supplying military weapons to the cartels.119 On April 14, 2011, 
Fox News Latino reported that 16 Mexican municipal police officers were arrested for 
their connections to a mass grave containing 120 people killed execution style. These 
officers allegedly helped to cover up information about the killers, who were believed to 
be members of Los Zetas cartel.120 In fact, police forces have had such high levels of 
corruption that Mexico‘s only reliable option to combat the cartels and corrupted police 
forces is the Mexican military.121 However, Mexico‘s military, primarily its army, is 
subject to corruption as well. Mexico reports that over the past few years, over 150,000 
military personnel have defected to work for the better paying cartels, and have taken 
their mostly U.S.-made weapons with them.122 
Corruption related to Mexican cartels also affects agencies outside of Mexico as 
well. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection are also prone to corruption by Mexican 
cartels. Recently, Customs and Border Protection officer Margarita Crispin was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison for accepting $5 million in bribes from Mexican cartels in 
exchange for allowing drugs to be smuggled through her assigned section of the 
U.S./Mexico border. The DEA reports that 80 people have been convicted of such 
corruption, while hundreds more are under investigation.123 
C. GOVERNMENT ANTI-CARTEL POLICIES 
Although corruption is the primary focus of this thesis, establishing a picture of 
other anti-cartel policies implemented by Mexico will help develop an idea of where 
most of Mexican efforts have been dedicated. Mexico, under the leadership of President 
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Felipe Calderón, has established an extremely aggressive approach to its drug problems 
by declaring war against the cartels when he took office in 2006. The war has been 
exceedingly bloody with little headway towards a victory over the cartels. The following 
sections examine the policies, intended effects and outcomes of Mexican government 
policies and those of members of the international community who maintain an interest in 
this situation.  
1. Mexican Policy Background 
On December 11, 2006, Calderón initiated Operation Michoacán, a controversial 
still ongoing operation and prompted the deployment of over 6,500 Mexican troops to the 
Michoacán area, which is under control of the drug cartels. To date, Operation 
Michoacán is responsible for the deaths of over 500 cartel members, as well as 50 
soldiers and 100 police officers. In addition, 10 Michoacán mayors and 20 other local 
officials have been detained on corruption charges.124 
One possible solution to the war on cartels has been the legalization of drug 
production and its use. In 2009, Mexico passed a bill that decriminalized the personal use 
of major narcotics; the law stipulated that people could use but not produce the narcotics. 
Under this law, the maximum amount of marijuana permitted for ―personal use‖ is five 
grams—the equivalent of about four marijuana cigarettes. Other limits are half a gram of 
cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, 40 milligrams of methamphetamine and 0.015 
milligrams of LSD.125 The intent of this bill was to distinguish the addicts and casual 
users from the large-scale drug traffickers. However, Mark Stevenson and Mexican 
political scientist Javier Oliva indicate that this bill is a ―serious contradiction‖ to the tone 
set by the Calderón administration.126 By contrast, former Mexican President Vicente  
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Fox is one of the many proponents of drug legalization that would make both the use of 
and production of drugs legal, while giving the government the right to regulate the 
markets.127 
2. Military Actions 
The Mexican military, as opposed to the vastly corrupt Mexican police forces, is 
the primary governmental tool used for combating the cartels, collecting intelligence and 
maintaining order within the population. Both President Fox and President Calderón 
found it necessary to use the Mexican military in a police role against the cartels due to 
the widely known corruption that plagues the Mexican police forces. The Mexican 
government deployed troops on several occasions to restore order in numerous cities 
across Mexico including Tijuana,128 Ciudad Juárez129 and Michoacán. In Ciudad Juárez 
alone, from 2008 to 2011, over 7,386 people have been killed, which includes cartel 
members, civilians, police, military, as well as American tourists and diplomatic 
personnel.130 While fighting these bloody battles against the cartels, the Mexican military 
has seen its share of success, as it has arrested or killed cartel leaders throughout the 
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Name 
Cartel / Position 






Los Zetas Cartel / 
Second in Command 
Oct 2009 Monterrey Arrested131 
Jesus Israel de la 
Cruz-Lopez 
Sinaloa Cartel / 
Capo 
















Mar 2003 Matamoros Arrested135 
Table 1.   Key Cartel Leaders Arrested or Killed by the Mexican Military 
The LA Times reports that, since 2006, the Mexican government has deployed 
over 50,000 troops in support of the war on drugs. By utilizing roadblocks, checkpoints, 
city patrols, and raids, the government has seized a vast amount of drugs and guns.136 
However, due to allegations of human rights violations by the military, as well as its 
susceptibility to corruption by cartel members, the Mexican military has begun to lose the 
support and trust of the population. In 2009, 72 percent of Mexicans viewed the army 
favorably, an 11 percent drop from 2007.137 In 2011, in response to a large number of 
human rights complaints against the military, the United Nations sent a group of experts 
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and scholars to Mexico to study interactions between the military and the population. 
This group concluded that the military does not currently possess the training or ability to 
conduct police duties and effectively interact with the civilian population. The UN further 
recommended that Mexico remove its military from the front lines of the war on drugs,138 
which would most certainly create a power vacuum that cartels could exploit to their 
benefit.139 
3. Reforms Implemented 
During the 71-year rule of the PRI, the public and international community did 
not pressure the government to reform. However, with the election of President Vicente 
Fox in 2000, the pressure to reform became apparent. The reforms that President Fox 
pursued during his presidency were largely geared towards fiscal and immigration 
progress. While the majority of President Fox‘s reforms were not focused on countering 
drugs and cartels, U.S. policy and Mexico experts Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra 
state that Fox did disband the Federal Judicial Police and replaced them with the Federal 
Investigations Agency, which was designed to be more professional and effective with 
improved command structures, internal controls and compartmentalized intelligence 
procedures. This institutional reform, however, did not aggressively prosecute corrupt 
police officers and most of the personnel that comprised the AFI were members of the 
disbanded Federal Judicial Police.140 Successes during President Fox‘s term included 
improved Mexican inflation to single digits, increased reserve money, drastically slowed 
the devaluation of the Mexican peso, reduced foreign debt, strengthened U.S./Mexico 
immigration ties and initiated the use of the military against the cartels, whose power was 
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increasing exponentially.141 President Fox‘s reforms went a long way towards 
establishing the roots for success that Mexico will require to defeat the cartels effectively.  
Similarly, President Calderón‘s political agenda from the beginning was and still 
is based upon the defeat of the cartels. In October 2010, President Calderón revealed that 
he planned to eliminate Mexico‘s approximate 2,200 local police squads and move 
towards a national unified police command in hopes of reducing the ability of the cartels 
to corrupt police officers, while also presenting a more cohesive and professional force to 
both Mexican citizens and to the international community. President Calderón admits that 
the reformation of the police forces into a transparent and nationally unified police force 
will take time and will not be completely immune to the corruption that has taken hold of 
approximately half of all local police forces.142 
One of the unintended drawbacks of the Mérida Initiative, discussed in the 
subsequent section, is that numerous violations of human rights occurred during the 
implementation phases of the new U.S./Mexico partnership. In March 2011, the Mexican 
Senate approved the reform of 11 articles of the Mexican Constitution to include 
elevating human rights provisions in international treaties approved by Mexico to the 
same level as the Constitution, incorporating respect for human rights into Mexico‘s 
education and penitentiary systems and in foreign policy, and establishing the right to a 
judicial hearing for any foreigner threatened with deportation. These constitutional 
reforms also expanded the powers of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) 
and the state-level human rights commissions that would allow them to field and 
investigate complaints and to issue recommendations regarding labor law violations. 
These debated reforms also initiated the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual 
preference.143 Another human rights reform that President Calderón initiated in late 2010 
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is that Mexican soldiers who commit crimes of torture, forced disappearance, and sexual 
violence be tried in civilian courts instead of military tribunals. Many human rights 
groups, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
in Mexico, criticize this reform as inadequate in that it does not cover all crimes against 
humanity, such as extrajudicial execution.144 
4. International Cooperation 
Although Mexico does not boast a strong partnership with the U.S. military, the 
United States has provided support to Mexico‘s fight against the cartels. In an effort to 
combat the growing threat of drug-related violence, the United States and Mexico 
announced the Mérida Initiative in October 2007. Since then, Congress has appropriated 
over $1.3 billion for this program in Mexico and almost $300 million for related 
programs in Central America and the Caribbean under the theory that improved security 
and reforms in these countries will improve security in the United States.145 The money 
provided to Mexico is intended to promote troop deployment to regions affected by drug 
violence and to establish a legal system with reduced corruption.146 A further $175 
million of this initiative was appropriated to help President Calderón expand appropriate 
judicial reforms.147 The future goals of the Mérida Initiative are to disrupt organized 
criminal groups, institutionalize reforms to sustain rule of law and respect for human 
rights, create a 21st century border, and build strong and resilient communities.148 
Perhaps one of the biggest successes of the Mérida Initiative was the 
institutionalization of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with the 
Mexican government. In addition to initializing 10-week long investigative training 
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programs for Mexican customs officials, a partnership program was created called 
―Armas Cruzadas‖ designed to combat the smuggling of firearms and ―Operation 
Firewall‖ to combat bulk-cash smuggling. From 2008 to 2010, Armas Cruzadas seized 
over 3,800 weapons, $10.5 million in U.S. currency and made 749 arrests. From 2005 to 
2010, Operation Firewall made almost 4,000 seizures totaling $302 million in addition to 
arresting 679 individuals.149 
ICE has not been the only agency to benefit from the enhanced cooperative 
relationship formed between the United States and Mexico through the Mérida Initiative. 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has worked with the 
Mexican government to establish a Spanish e-Trace web-based system to track smuggled 
U.S. originated weapons. The two are also creating and perfecting Plataforma Mexico, a 
data tracing and drug intelligence collection and sharing system of Mexico‘s criminal 
justice data system in hopes of reducing the incentive to obtain U.S. firearms illegally.150  
Many critics who refer to the similarities between the Mérida Initiative and Plan 
Colombia often sarcastically refer to the Mérida Initiative as ―Plan Mexico.‖151 These 
same critics are quick to stress that, while the U.S. spent over $1 billion on Plan 
Colombia, cocaine production has steadily increased and registered a 27 percent increase 
in 2007.152 In contrast to Plan Colombia, which was largely based on military aid to 
Colombia, the Mérida Initiative contains provisions aimed at addressing broader 
concerns, such as human rights training for Mexican Soldiers and over $73.5 million 
alone in earmarks for institutions building and rule-of-law issues.153 These provisions 
were deemed crucial in light of the current levels of human rights abuses committed by 
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the armed forces, which totaled about 800 in the first five months of 2008 alone.154 While 
most Human Rights abuses claims are filed for misconduct or illegal searches, others are 
as serious as rape and torture. A growing number of citizens are concerned that the 
Mexican military is ―becoming too powerful in the face of state weakness—a chilling 
reminder of a more repressive era.‖155 Rights groups have often questioned the use of the 
military to fight the drug cartels, but political analysts agree that troops are the only real 
option in a country where as many as half the police could be on the payroll of drug 
cartels.156 
Mexico has not always been a proponent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the 
United States; however, since Present Calderón took office, he has increased extradition 
rates as a tool against the cartels. Despite this, extradition terms between Mexico and the 
United States still do not promote maximum legal flexibility. For example, the 1978 
Extradition Treaty does not make extradition a requirement and does not provide clear 
guidelines for crimes that do not fit the description of one of the 19 types of offenses 
listed in the treaty. Other extradition difficulties arise because of the difference in 
punishments allowed by Mexico as compared to the United States. Mexico‘s government 
considers capital punishment and life imprisonment to be unconstitutional, while the 
United States allows for both—depending on the state of prosecution.157 Two notable 
Mexico extraditions to the United States include Gulf Cartel boss Osiel Cárdenas-Guillén 
in 2007,158 and Tijuana Cartel boss Benjamin Arellano Felix in 2011.159 
Mexico has also developed a working bond with Colombia, and received training 
on better police practices and commando tactics to apply against the cartels. The training 
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also incorporates resources from the United States, such as personnel and funding—
$800,000 as of 2011.160 Another international player with great interest in the Mexican 
cartels is the government of Guatemala. Initially, Guatemala had not played a dominant 
role in combating the Mexican cartels due largely to its inability to confront the better 
equipped and trained cartels, such as Los Zetas.161 However, in December 2010, the 
president of Guatemala declared a state of siege for 30 days to go after the cartels in 
northern Guatemala near the border with Mexico.162 While cooperation between Mexico 
and Guatemala has mainly come in the form of information exchange, the recent arrest of 
Guatemala‘s top drug lord, Juan Ortiz Lopez, may signal the beginning of closer 
cooperation between the United States, Guatemala, and ultimately, Mexico.163 
5. Lessons Learned  
The problems that arise from the policies, military actions and reforms 
implemented by the Mexican government help to narrow the focus of decision makers to 
which policies are working most effectively and what else needs to be done. From what 
has been discussed, due to law enforcement corruption, military action has been most 
effective at physically combating the cartels, but this combat is encouraging greater 
violence, military corruption levels and degraded public trust. According to the UN, more 
specific law enforcement training is required for the military if Calderón continues to 
place the military at the front lines of the war.  
Also severely lacking is transparency in the Mexican government and police 
force. Calderón is working towards reforms that should allow the public to see that the 
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government and police forces are not plagued by corruption, but these reforms are only in 
their political infancy and will take several years to take effect. The slow pace of 
progress, however, is not surprising due to the extensive nature of reforming the roots of 
a country‘s embedded law enforcement structure.  
The Mérida Initiative has enhanced the cooperation between the United States and 
Mexico by introducing intelligence sharing capabilities, funding the purchase of 
equipment for the Mexican military, and providing more efficient border control 
cooperation. Through this partnership with the United States, Mexico has made forward 
progress against the cartels. Mexico has developed a closer working relationship with 
Colombia, and other bordering countries that share in Mexico‘s problems, such as 
Guatemala, have also improved cooperation with Mexico.  
D.  CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS 
To perform a COG analysis, it is important to investigate what makes the cartels 
function, as well as what holds them together and allows them to flourish. These critical 
capabilities enable the COG, including the ability to corrupt and coerce, which are 
essential to cartel operations. The final goal of this chapter is to identify the capabilities 
and vulnerabilities of the cartels, which the Mexican government can target for 
exploitation to defeat its center of gravity.  
1. Root of the Problem 
Many members of the Mexican government once believed that the drug market 
was the center of gravity of its drug trade, but Mexican drug eradication policies from the 
1970s through the early 1990s provided only limited success and were later 
abandoned.164 Another popular theory was that the Mexican cartels‘ center of gravity was 
cartel leadership. However, numerous cartel kingpins have been arrested or killed only to  
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have a new leader step up and assume leadership duties without any notable decline in 
cartel activity. The transition periods are especially violent as rivals fight for control of 
trafficking operations.  
The authors of this thesis argue that cartel influence is the actual center of gravity 
of the cartels. Cartel influence is an inclusive variable that refers to the cartel‘s ability to 
conduct its operations through its critical capabilities. This influence allows the cartels to 
corrupt officials, conduct intimidation tactics and control the illicit drug market.  
2. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Requirements Identified 
Cartel critical capabilities are essential for the cartel to function. Four critical 
capabilities are particularly important for this center of gravity analysis: versatility, 
extended reach, ability to corrupt and coerce government officials, and the ability to 
operate independently.  
Cartels are very versatile in that they have numerous sources of funding and are 
involved in various activities. In other words, cartels are not dependent on any one 
portion of their operations for survival but have diversified sources of income including 
drug trafficking, kidnapping, and other moneymaking enterprises. Furthermore, cartels 
operate heavily not only in Mexico, but also in Guatemala and the United States.  
The capability of the cartels to reach out with violence or other types of influence 
extends well beyond the borders of Mexico. Mexican cartels use financial influence to 
corrupt U.S. Border Patrol agents and to create large distribution networks extending all 
the way from Atlanta to Seattle. Foot soldier recruitment occurs in the United States, as 
well as in Guatemala. Arms are trafficked into Mexico from the United States, Central 
America, South America and the Caribbean Islands. Human smuggling is also an 
extremely lucrative activity for the cartels that involves virtually every country directly 
reachable by Mexican transportation.  
Corruption and coercion are mechanisms used by the cartels that allow them to 
operate freely without serious fear of arrest. Having this influence over military, police 
and government agencies is a critical capability common to all organized crime 
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syndicates. Corruption opens up drug trafficking entryways into the United States, 
influences police forces to both ignore and to help cartel activities and keeps low-level  
cartel members on the streets and in business. Successful and continuous corruption 
provides cartels with independence, notoriety and freedom of action. Cartels gain the 
majority of their influential capabilities through corruption and coercion.  
Lastly, cartels have the capability to operate almost completely independently. 
This critical capability is more of a survival requirement resulting from one of the critical 
vulnerabilities of the Mexican cartels—competition. With the drug trade generating 
upwards of $45 billion annually, competition for the biggest slice of the pie grows fierce. 
This ―every-man-for-himself‖ scenario creates a Darwin-like environment in which only 
the strongest survive and thrive. To operate, cartels rely on the voluminous flow of illicit 
income, corrupt political partnerships, criminal networks, and foot soldiers to maintain 
their mandate, gun supply sources, distribution routes, infrastructure and other various 
logistics support.  
Throughout the chapter, a few necessary requirements can be found to sustain the 
cartels‘ critical capabilities, which are illicit markets, cartel notoriety, corruptible 
officials, political connections, foot soldiers, networks, guns and equipment. Without a 
market, cartels would lose some level of versatility that would depend on which market 
was being affected. Control over market supply is largely a product of poverty. 
Impoverished citizens have two options: earn little to no money in a licit market or earn 
higher profits in the extremely lucrative illicit drug market. According to drug expert 
Michael Lyman, drug traffickers can earn gross profit margins of up to 300 percent.165 
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(<$2/day) and 8 percent live in extreme poverty (<$1/day),166 compared to the 9.7 
percent of U.S. families living in poverty, which for the United States, is over 13 times 
higher than the poverty line of Mexico.167 
A cartel‘s notoriety helps to determine the cartel‘s ability to corrupt and coerce. 
The more notorious a cartel, the more effective its coercion and corruption efforts will be. 
For corruption and coercion to be effective, the target official must be willing to be 
corrupted or coerced.168 Otherwise, the official could stand against the cartel, which 
could possibly force the cartel to assassinate the official. The final product of a cartel‘s 
ability to corrupt or coerce is the political connection collected. This connection provides 
intelligence, perhaps some level of political immunity from law enforcement, and further 
facilitates political corruption, which increases the reach and the individual cartel‘s 
ability to operate independently.  
Networks are necessary as they allow more efficient communication between 
cartel members and better logistics. If a cartel has a strong network, the organization will 
increase its influential reach, ability to operate independently and capability to corrupt or 
coerce. Finally, foot soldiers, infrastructure, guns and equipment are all required to do the 
work of the cartel, which grants the cartel increased influential reach and ability to 
operate independently.  
Cartel recruitment amongst Mexican military deserters and veterans has been very 
successful. Mexico cartel authority George W. Grayson states that the Mexican military 
has raised commando salary to $1,100 per month in 2007 in an effort to pay commandoes 
more than the cartels were offering. However, the cartels promptly increased the pay of 
their foot soldiers and cartel recruitment was again unaffected.169 
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Cartels have few critical vulnerabilities, and as a result, are exceptionally difficult 
to target, eliminate or even weaken. Competition between cartels is one critical 
vulnerability. Competition over the drug trade creates great incentive for cartels to plot 
against one another. Although not the prime source of violence, inter-cartel violence is 
still a significant contributor to the death toll in Mexico. A cartel on the losing side of 
competition may experience a loss of notoriety and base resources, such as foot soldiers, 
guns, equipment and infrastructure.  
Hubris is another critical vulnerability displayed by the Beltran-Leyva Cartel, as 
well as others.170 The Beltran-Leyva Cartel, as noted earlier in this chapter, has 
experienced a string of arrests or deaths of its leaders since its inception in 2008. Other 
cartels that may have experienced hubris include Gulf and Sinaloa, both having 
documented arrests or deaths of their top leaders. Hubris can lead to a cartel over 
extending itself, which can result in slip-ups, such as arrests of cartel leaders and losing 
control over market sectors to rival cartels. Hubris, or just an underestimation of 
government abilities, could lead to further seizing of cartel drug lords in the future.  
Perhaps the best approach to attacking the cartels‘ center of gravity is through the 
implementation of social, law enforcement and political reform. Figure 5 is an illustration 
of the Mexican cartels‘ current COG, CC, CR and CV. 
                                                 





Figure 5.   Illustration of the Mexican Cartels‘ Current COG, CC, CR and CV 
3.  Where Should Energy Be Focused 
Mexico must focus on strengthening its vulnerabilities to maximize its ability to 
combat the cartels. From the case study, a few critical vulnerabilities of the Mexican 
government become evident. Corruption is deeply rooted within the ranks of Mexican 
politics, military and law enforcement. Associated with this corruption is Mexico‘s lack 
of transparency, which causes a decrease of public trust in the government. Without trust, 
the government experiences diminished support from the public, which is necessary for 
conducting military operations against the cartels. Governance scholar Steven David 
argues, ―Mexico faces a crisis of legitimacy. In the face of a myriad of problems, its 
government, characterized by a weak presidency and a divided Congress, is unable to do 
much of anything. To make matters worse, while the government has drastically 
promised reforms and improvement to both law enforcement and the army, drug  
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traffickers have infiltrated every level of government, including the president's office.‖171 
Until the Mexican government is successful in attacking corruption, the cartels will 
continue to have the upper hand. 
Mexico also needs to improve its collaboration with its border states. Mexico has 
very little cooperation with Guatemala, which shares in the troubles of the Mexican 
cartels. Mexico‘s political cooperation with the United States is very active, but the 
military-to-military cooperation is practically non-existent, which stems from a history of 
mistrust towards the U.S. military on Mexican soil.  
Another goal that Mexico must focus on is creating more critical vulnerabilities 
for the cartels. To do this, Mexico must turn cartel critical requirements into 
vulnerabilities. For example, through the implementation of true institutional and social 
reform, Mexico can remove the opportunity for cartels to own the loyalties of 
government and police officials. Latin American democracy and corruption expert, 
Stephen Morris suggests that corruption and perceived impunity go hand in hand—
corrupt officials must be seen as being punished for actual and perceived corruption 
levels to drop. Blake and Morris emphasize other factors that will reduce corruption, 
which include increased wealth in the population, horizontal accountability and 
separation of powers.172 Furthermore, social reforms that create more jobs in slum border 
towns and throughout Mexico could lower poverty levels and increase incentives for licit 
market participation. These reforms must be implemented with institutional reforms that 
will give police forces, military and judicial organizations the needed transparency to 
lower corruption to a level allowing efficient function. If both social and institutional 
reforms are designed and implemented effectively, the citizens of Mexico should develop 
a strong sense of legitimate economic security and enough trust in Mexican law 
enforcement to turn their loyalties against the cartels with protection from cartel 
retaliation—protection that is not currently offered by Mexican law enforcement 
agencies. Once these reforms have been implemented, certain cartel critical requirements 
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can be weakened to the point that they become critical vulnerabilities. Not having a vast 
number of corruptible officials and political connections would open up cartel 
independence and its ability to corrupt and coerce to attack. This attack could come in the 
form of military and police assault on cartel leadership or foot soldiers. While this form 
of attack is already being conducted against the cartels, the same attacks would have 
much more legitimacy with the real support of the police and of the public. The final 
chapter of this thesis further explores further possible reforms, their effects and the 
attacks that become available to Mexico against the cartels.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Mexico‘s cartels have their hands in a vast number of operations and tactics, have 
many capabilities, few vulnerabilities and are responsible for much of the corruption 
plaguing Mexican politics and its security forces. The Government of Mexico, on the 
other hand, also has various vulnerabilities. However, a key difference between the 
Mexican government and the cartels is that the government has international allies with 
great interest in defeating the cartels while the cartels are independent entities fiercely 
competing with one another for market and resource control.  
The Mexican military, law enforcement, and constitutional and social reforms 
must be implemented for Mexico to defeat its cartels. While President Calderon has taken 
an aggressive approach to this problem under his aggressive leadership, the country is 
making some strides towards reform; however, these reforms remain in a relative infancy. 
The Mexican government has a long road of reform and military operations ahead of it.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: COLOMBIA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE 
DRUG TRADE AND CORRUPTION 
If a state is not even present in certain areas, it ―doesn‘t play.‖ It leaves the 
human terrain to the challenger. If the state is present but dysfunctional, 
corrupt, and brutal, it is probably better that it is absent.173 
 
 
Figure 6.   Map of Colombia with Coca Cultivation Areas Highlighted.174 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
Colombia is regularly referred to as one of the oldest continuous democracies in 
Latin America; interestingly, it also has one of the bloodiest histories in the region. The 
incidents of murder, political assassinations, kidnappings, and drug related violence rank 
amongst the highest in the world.175 This violence could be said to have its roots in 
political violence between liberal and conservative groups beginning in the 1940s that 
culminated in an urban insurrection in Bogotá known as “El Bogotazo” in 1948.176 The 
10-year period that followed referred to as La Violencia or The Violence was a bloody 
civil war that claimed anywhere from 80,000 to more than 400,000 lives, depending on 
the source referenced.177 By the 1960s, rural Liberal groups inspired by the Cuban 
Revolution and other Marxist sympathizers had formed leftist guerilla movements to 
challenge the GOC. These groups quickly grew in numbers and soon controlled large 
portions of the country. In response, paramilitary groups, formed under the pretext of 
battling these insurgent groups, grew in numbers and, like their insurgent counterparts, 
became beneficiaries of the drug trafficking business.178 In addition, powerful quasi-
military drug cartels would surface wielding fortunes so vast that they could threaten 
national security. The icing to the cake is provided by the ―the ever-present corruption in 
an environment saturated with the easy money of the narcotics trade‖ and it becomes 
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clear that the government is at a problematic impasse.179 The widespread corruption 
present in the Colombian government (GOC) and its security forces, chiefly its police 
forces, played a central role in the disastrous situation that Colombia by the mid-1980s.  
By 1998, Transparency International‘s Global Corruption Perceptions Index 
ranked Colombia as 2.2 out of 10, where 10 represents ―highly clean‖ and 0 is ―highly 
corrupt.‖ In 2010, the index ranked Colombia 78 out of 178 countries, with an index 
score of 3.5.180 While this score still appears to show high levels of corruption, it is a 
huge leap from the 2.2 score it earned in 1998. This case study shows that corruption in 
Colombia was a catalyst for illicit drug trafficking and the criminal organizations that 
profit from it. 
B. HISTORY OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN COLOMBIA 
The Internal Relations and Security Network-Zurich emphasizes that, ―Colombia 
is the only country in the world to produce three plant-based drugs: marijuana (from 
hemp), cocaine (from the coca leaf) and heroin (from poppy).181 Several authors and 
Colombian experts trace the origins of large-scale drug production in Colombia to 
Medellín in the early 1950s during which the first illegal drug laboratory was reportedly 
established.182 The drugs, including cocaine, heroin and morphine, were smuggled from 
Colombia to Cuba where American and Cuban organized crime groups further smuggled 
them into the United States using intricate distribution networks to disperse the product. 
                                                 
179 Thomas A. Marks, ―Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for ―Democratic 
Security,‖ Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, Shaping the Regional Security Environment 
in Latin America (July 2005): 21, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=610. 
180 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results (Brussels: Transparency 
International, 2011), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 
181 ISN Zurich, ―Drug Trade in Colombia,‖ ISN, May 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-
Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&ots627=fce62fe0-528d-4884-9cdf-
283c282cf0b2&id=123022&tabid=123967&contextid734=123022&contextid735=123967. 
182 Mario Arango and Jorge Child, Narcotrafico: Imperio de la Cocaina (Mexico City: Edivision 
Compania Editorial, 1987), 119–120; Andres Lopez- Restrepo and Alvaro Camacho-Guizado, ―From 
Smugglers to Drug-Lords to ‗Traquetos‘: Changes in the Colombian Illicit Drugs Organizations,‖ 
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 28, no. 55–56 (2003): 249–276; Vanda 
Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 71. 
 62 
In their book, Narcotrafico, Colombian scholars Arango and Child recount an interview 
they conducted with an old Colombian drug smuggler, who was imprisoned in Cuba and 
later deported to Colombia.183 The old smuggler claimed that the Medellín laboratory 
only worked part of the year and produced small quantities of drugs to prevent detection 
by the GOC.184 Once demand for these drugs increased in the 1960s and 1970s, the drug 
production business mushroomed into a multi-billion dollar per year industry, and thus, 
making the risk of detection bearable.  
Marijuana did not become a major export product for Colombia until both 
domestic and international demand increased exponentially during the 1960s. The 
increase in demand coincided with decreases in Mexican and Jamaican marijuana 
production due to eradication campaigns conducted by those governments under pressure 
from the U.S. government.185 Another reason for the growth of the drug organizations in 
Colombia during the 1970s was their decision to eliminate their Cuban distribution 
network inside the United States by assassination, which gave them control of the entire 
wholesale market of marijuana inside the country.186 They further consolidated control 
by bribing corrupt politicians, judges and policemen. Once it became clear that Colombia 
had taken over the marijuana market, the United States began applying pressure on the 
government of President Julio César Turbay-Ayala, whom the U.S. government 
suspected of being highly corrupt and having ties to drug traffickers.187 The eradication 
of marijuana coupled with the increased demand for cocaine, which was easier to produce 
and yielded far higher profits, soon made the coca industry in Colombia explode. This 
lucrative cocaine economy gave rise to the notorious drug cartels of Colombia, and more 
notably, the Medellín and the Cali cartels. Cocaine would also eventually become the 
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main source of income for insurgent groups, such as the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, ―Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia‖ (FARC,) as 
well as other illegal armed groups.188  
1. The Medellín Cartel 
Undoubtedly, the most notorious Colombian cartel was the Medellín Cartel, 
headed by Pablo Escobar. Beginning as early as the 1970s, Escobar‘s cartel controlled 
vast portions of drug production, smuggling and distribution inside the United States and 
was the most feared cartel until Colombian security forces eventually dismantled it in the 
early 1990s with assistance from the United States.189 Pablo Escobar gained international 
notoriety and has been called the wealthiest criminal of all time by Forbes magazine, 
which also declared him the seventh richest person in the world in 1989.190 At its peak, 
his cartel‘s profits were believed to be nearly $50 million dollars a day.191 While bribing 
corrupt government officials often facilitated their operations, the Medellín cartel was 
also known for intimidating public officials with the threat of violence and is believed 
responsible for the assassination of scores of people.192 For example, in August 1989, 
Pablo Escobar is believed to have ordered the assassination of presidential candidate Luis 
Carlos Galán, who was a strong supporter of extradition and had led a previous 
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movement to disqualify Escobar from running in the presidential elections.193 Escobar 
also ordered the assassination of the federal justice who indicted him for Galán‘s murder.  
By 1990, the Medellín cartel‘s terror tactics, indiscriminate bombings, and 
daytime shootings would turn the streets of Bogotá into a war zone and cause a sense of 
panic among the populace.194 Although the cartel wielded a great degree of influence 
over corrupt government officials during its peak, it was Escobar‘s declaration of war 
against the GOC in the mid-1980s that set his cartel apart from others. In his book, 
Killing Pablo, Mark Bowden recalls a message released by a group of assassins under 
Escobar‘s employment called The Extraditables: 
We are declaring total and absolute war on the government, on the 
individual and political oligarchy, on the journalists who have attacked 
and insulted us, on the judges that have sold themselves to the 
government, on the extraditing magistrates — on all those who have 
persecuted and attacked us. We will not respect the families of those who 
have not respected our families. We will burn and destroy the industries, 
properties and mansions of the oligarchy.195 
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Figure 7.   Pablo Escobar-Gaviria; Leader of the Medellín Cartel (December 1, 1949–
December 2, 1993).196 
Prior to his death in 1993 at the hands of a Colombian special tactics unit trained 
by U.S. Special Forces, and the eventual collapse of the Medellín cartel, Escobar 
successfully oversaw the assassination of countless journalists, politicians, judges, police 
officers, up to five presidential candidates and even the downing of an Avianca flight, 
which killed 119 persons.197 According to narcoterrorism expert Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
the FBI in Florida intercepted an attempt by Medellín cartel members to purchase more 
than 100 stinger-surface to air missiles.198 Unquestionably, that FBI operation saved 
hundreds of lives and millions of dollars in aircraft. 
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2. The Cali Cartel 
After the fall of the Medellín cartel, the Cali cartel wisely chose to rely more on 
their ability to bribe public officials rather than the use of violence. After his arrest and 
eventual extradition to the United States for drug trafficking, former Cali cartel boss 
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela stated, ―we don‘t kill judges or ministers, we buy them.‖199 
During a congressional testimony given by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 
1996, DEA administrator Thomas Constantine stated, ―the Cali cartel, fashioned itself 
after the Sicilian Mafia, also known as La Cosa Nostra and therefore became far more 
sophisticated and successful than its predecessors.‖200 The cartel members aspired to 
enter the elite political circles of Colombian society and come across as businessmen 
rather than drug trafficking thugs. Although the Cali cartel never achieved the profit 
levels of the Medellín cartel, their operations were far more sophisticated and involved 
the systematic corruption of nearly every government ministry.201 
While the Cali cartel preferred low-key operations to attract little attention, its 
desire to enter Colombian political circles ultimately led to their demise.202 By 1994, 
leaked tapes revealed that the Cali cartel had heavily funded the presidential campaign of 
Ernesto Samper, which led the United States to formally decertifying Colombia in 1997 
for failing to support drug eradication efforts, and consequently, suspending U.S. foreign 
aid.203 The U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Madeleine Albright, stated in a press 
conference that the measures against the GOC were taken ―as a result of our concern that 
corruption remains rampant at the highest levels of the Colombian government and that 
senior officials are failing to cooperate with us in the fight against drugs.‖204 To get back 
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into the good graces of the U.S. government, President Samper went after the Cali cartel 
and, by 1995, the GOC had arrested the cartel‘s leaders, which soon led to the 
disintegration of the organization.  
3. The “Cartelitos” and the FARC 
Following the defeat of the Cali cartel, countless small and less powerful cartels, 
often called cartelitos, emerged to fill the colossal and extremely lucrative worldwide 
demand for cocaine. The increased competition and production drove the price of cocaine 
down and, by 2000, Colombian cocaine production had reached an all-time high of 695 
metric tons, which had increased from approximately 120 metric tons during the height of 
the two big cartels.205 In addition, insurgent and paramilitary groups, primarily the 
FARC, which had been steadily growing since the 1960s, stepped in and took control 
over large swaths of the drug business. While none of these organizations have operated 
at the levels the Medellín or Cali cartels once did, as a whole, they have continued to 
supply over 90% of the U.S. cocaine market.206  
Unlike the drug cartels, the FARC initially opposed drug trafficking because of 
the capitalistic nature of the business. While the FARC historically targeted Colombian 
political, economic and security infrastructure, initially, they also sabotaged coca 
production facilities and destroyed harvests in the name of their Marxist revolution. 
However, the strategy of targeting coca production soon diminished its public support 
among the rural population that largely depended on coca farming to support their 
families. The FARC was left with little choice but to accept the drug trafficking business 
as a necessary evil, and instead, taxed coca farmers and traffickers in exchange for 
protection against government eradication efforts.207  
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After the breakup of the two major cartels in the late 1990s, it was estimated that 
more than 70% of the opium trade and over 55% of the cocaine trade had fallen under 
control of the FARC. Additionally, by the early 2000s, the FARC controlled the 
cultivation, production and wholesale distribution to the criminal organizations that 
further distribute the drugs within North America and Europe.208 It is estimated that over 
50% of the FARC‘s income is derived from the drug business, 34% comes from the 
extortion of oil companies and other businesses, 8% from kidnapping, 6% from cattle 
rustling, and the remainder from bank robberies and nepotism.209 Kidnapping alone 
provided the FARC nearly $1 billion dollars in revenue between 1991 and 1998.210 The 
decentralization of the drug industry in Colombia along with the threat of extradition to 
the United States because of a 1997 constitutional amendment pushed the smuggling and 
distribution facet of the business over to Mexican cartels.  
C. CORRUPTION AS A NEXUS FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
Criminal organizations cannot flourish without corruption; it is an indispensable 
requirement for criminal activity. Whether bribing a police officer or enticing a high-
ranking politician to influence government policies, Colombia‘s criminal groups have 
relied greatly on the wealth provided by the drug trafficking business to buy influence 
with practically any politician or government official. The violent nature of these groups 
has also helped to intimidate the population into participating in the illicit drug trade 
either indirectly (e.g., coca crop production) or directly (e.g., transporting and selling 
narcotics) as is witnessed largely in rural areas of Colombia.211 Furthermore, the threat of 
violence against individuals unwilling to be corrupted is always present. As previously  
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mentioned, this is referred to in Spanish as plomo o plata—‖Bullet or Money?‖ Elizabeth 
Mora-Mass, a Colombian journalist who interviewed Pablo Escobar several times during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, quoted him as saying:  
Money can be a weapon as well as an instrument for manipulation, 
everyone has a price, the important thing is to find out what it i… and 
Sometimes I feel like God, when I order someone killed—they die the 
same day...212 
In 1991, Pablo Escobar boldly issued an ultimatum to a Colombian congressional 
assembly convening to discuss whether a new constitution should ban extradition to the 
United States. The ultimatum delivered to assembly members read:  
If you vote ―no‖ to extradition, Mr. Escobar promises to pay you each $1 
million dollars in cash and he also promises not to kill you and your entire 
family.213  
The congressional assembly approved the new constitution banning extradition in a 
closed-door session by a vote of 51–13.214 
D. COLOMBIA’S STRATEGY  
Prior to the election of President Uribe in 2002, the GOC viewed the security 
threat posed by drug trafficking organizations, the FARC and the paramilitaries, as a 
military problem best left to the Colombian military. The state did not assume a direct 
role in the fight, and thus, left the civil-military aspect of the fight incomplete. In other 
words, the Colombian government did not view the problem as significant enough to 
require a unified national approach utilizing all the elements on national power. As 
witnessed by the decapitation operations of the two major cartels threatening Colombian 
national security in the 1990s, ultimately, the GOC‘s purely military strategy led to the 
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rise of the cartelitos and provided the FARC an avenue to grow.215 U.S. Naval Special 
Warfare Officer and counterinsurgency expert, Commander Victor Hyder, offers that 
while the killing of Pablo Escobar did serve to liberate ―Colombia and the world of an 
extremely dangerous enemy...the structure of the Colombian narcotics industry as a 
whole is not vulnerable to decapitation.‖216 Therefore, a strategy that addresses the 
conditions that encourage illicit activities must be implemented. This condition is 
corruption.  
In 1998, Colombian Presidential candidate Andrés Pastrana first made mention of 
a ―Colombian Marshall Plan‖ aimed at targeting social ills believed at fault for the 
continuing drug smuggling and providing alternatives that would attract peasants from 
joining the insurgencies or the drug trade. Retrospection today shows that U.S. 
lawmakers inaccurately assumed that Colombia‘s problems stemmed from the narcotics 
trade and not from a lack of security or social problems.217 This flawed thinking led to 
strict restrictions on how U.S. aid money could be utilized, which focused on 
counternarcotics (primarily aerial spraying to eradicate illegal crops), and minimally, on 
counterinsurgent operations or the social ills highlighted by President Pastrana. 
Colombian expert Enrique Desmond Arias states that drug trafficking in Colombia 
―involves active participation from leftist insurgents and paramilitaries, corrupt police 
and military officers, and common criminals.‖218 For this reason, a new strategy was 
urgently needed to combat the growing threat. The strategy presented by President 
Alvaro Uribe in 2003, albeit not perfect, made important strides towards the reform 
needed in Colombia. 
Upon his election to office in 2002, President Álvaro Uribe-Velez introduced the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSDP), which provided the GOC a new 
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strategy aimed at not only destroying the criminal groups, but also addressing the social 
ills that enable their existence.219 The DSDP stresses that ―strengthening of the rule of 
law is the essential prerequisite to achieving the aim of Democratic Security: the 
protection of each and every citizen.‖220 However, a fundamental prerequisite to effective 
rule of law is the lack of rampant corruption. Therefore, it was essential that the policy 
focus great attention on the problem of corruption. The policy promises the citizens that 
the government aims to gain their trust by assuring them that corruption is no longer 
acceptable and will be punished harshly. It is stated directly as such:  
Just as citizens are expected to contribute to the strengthening of the 
security forces through the payment of taxes, so will the Government and 
the security forces work within the principles of efficiency, transparency 
and economy, to ensure that every peso spent contributes to security.221 
Moreover, the policy states, ―the strengthening of a culture of honesty and 
openness with effective mechanisms and tools to eradicate corruption is a matter of 
priority.‖222 This belief is a critical facet for gaining the support of the population in any 
country because if the citizenry believes the government condones corruption, it is nearly 
impossible to inspire it to obey laws and much less to share in the struggle against 
lawlessness. The culture of corruption present in Latin America must be eradicated if any 
government wishes to earn the respect of its citizens effectively. 
1. Background and Implementation 
In 2002, President Uribe introduced many changes in the country‘s strategy 
against crime syndicates. Chiefly, his administration addressed the systematic issues 
believed to be the root causes of the problem. Colombian expert Thomas Marks 
highlights the issues with an excerpt from DSDP that states: 
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 Lack of personal security is at the root of Colombia's social, economic, 
and political ills.  
 This lack of personal security stems from the state's absence from large 
swaths of the national territory.  
 Therefore, all elements of national power need to be directed toward 
ending this lack of national integration.223 
The third bullet refers to the lack of a Whole of Government (WoG) approach to 
the problem. WoG commonly refers to the application of all instruments of national 
power to address a threat posed against the state, often referred to as DIME—
Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic; or PMESII—Political, Military, 
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. Since the fight in Colombia was 
internal, the GOC viewed WoG as an interagency/inter-ministry effort in which all 
elements of national power must be employed against the threat to achieve victory.224 
While the Democratic Security and Defense Policy divides this strategy into six courses 
of action (COAs), this thesis explains the process more clearly by using a ―Clear, Hold & 
Build‖ model as illustrated in Figure 8.225  
 
                                                 
223 Presidency of the Republic/Ministry of Defence, ―The Uribe Administration‘s Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy‖ (Embassy of Colombia, 2003), 
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visita_bush/documentos/security.pdf. 
224 Thomas A. Marks, ―Colombia: Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response,‖ Prism/NDU 
Press 1, no. 4 (September 2010): 143. 
225 Julian Borger, ―Senate Presses Rice Over Iraq Exit Strategy | World news | The Guardian,‖ 
October 20, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/20/usa.iraq; This term was first referenced 
2005 by former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice while discussing U.S. strategy for defeating insurgents 
in Iraq.  
 73 
 
Figure 8.   ―Clear, Hold & Build‖ Model.  
The first key requirement for the success of this model is a strong and 
professional security force that possesses the complete and total support of the 
population. The government utilizes the military to target vulnerabilities and target the 
leadership structure. Particular attention is paid to enemy critical nodes, physical 
capabilities, and operational methods. The desired outcome is to capture or kill the 
organization‘s leadership. Second, the government immediately establishes security and 
protects the population with professional military, national police and local forces 
recruited from among the population and trained by the military. Establishing fusion 
centers in which information is shared both vertically and horizontally synchronizes this 
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task.226 Moreover, effective security denies criminals the opportunity to return. The 
police also assist in re-establishing courts to address complaints and ensure the legal 
system remains in place.227 Lastly, with the establishment of security comes economic 
assistance in the form of food grants, money grants for economic development, 
electricity, email connectivity, roads, schools and all the good things derived from good 
governance. Most importantly, these things must happen quickly so that the population 
promptly sees the tangible benefits of improved governance.   
2. Political Reform 
The DSDP addresses the lack of security caused largely by corruption and 
reminds the citizens that security is everyone‘s responsibility, not only the state‘s. The 
policy declares: 
It is the role of the State to uphold the rights of the citizen and to provide 
the institutional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
However, the proper functioning of institutions also requires the active 
participation, solidarity and commitment of the citizen. Democratic 
participation consists not only in the use of the vote, but also in the 
observation and promotion of the civic values which uphold pluralistic 
political debate, in playing an active role in public affairs and in the 
defence of the freedom of each individual.228  
President Uribe acknowledged that the criminal organizations operating within 
Colombia‘s borders were unique entities that could not be defeated simply with a military 
approach; instead, it would require the population‘s help to succeed. The DSDP notes 
that all elements of national power must be mobilized and all must participate for the 
survival and prosperity of the nation.  
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The State will embark upon a policy of territorial consolidation, re-
establishing the normal operation of the justice system, strengthening local 
democracy, meeting the most urgent needs of the population, broadening 
state services and initiating medium to long term projects aimed at 
creating sustainable development.229 
President Uribe began his term by changing his country‘s strategy of addressing 
the drug production problem230 by introducing a plan that made the security of the 
citizens of Colombia the foundation upon which all counter drug policies would be 
built.231 Proof of President Uribe‘s resolve was the 2006 implementation of a ―war tax‖ 
on higher-income families and corporations to fund the training of 6,000 new Special 
Operations soldiers, 10,000 new police officers and to recruit over 100,000 civilian 
informants.232 In addition to military spending and action, the plan has initiated reform. It 
also relies heavily on international cooperation. 
3. Military Reform 
Military reform is most visible in the professionalization of the Colombian 
military. While the military had begun taking the steps necessary to implement reforms 
under President Pastrana‘s administration, a clear lack of leadership was missing until the 
arrival of President Uribe in 2002. The new administration emphasized recruiting and 
creating specialty units. Historically an all draftee force, the Colombian Army soon had 
volunteer numbers as high as 1/3 of its force, while specialty and key units boasted a 
100% all-volunteer force. Military education was overhauled by using lessons learned to 
modify operational and organizational doctrine and by developing a strong and capable 
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NCO corps capable of leading small units.233 While nearly every facet of the Colombian 
military was affected during this reform, no single action had a bigger effect on reform 
than the fact that Colombian military officers led the reform. The officers taught their 
men that integrity and selfless service are nonnegotiable, and they taught it by example. 
Former Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces General Carlos Ospina notes that a 
testament to the Colombian military‘s professionalism is that it routinely ranks at the top 
of public opinion polls regarding the most respected institutions in the country.234 
4. International Cooperation 
Colombia is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid outside of the Middle East. 
Since the United States is the world‘s largest consumer of illegal drugs, it is not 
surprising that it has the strongest desire to reduce drug production and trafficking. When 
President Pastrana officially presented his plan to U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1999, the 
plan came under intense scrutiny by U.S. lawmakers for its lack of focus on counter-drug 
operations, military aid and aerial spray fumigation. It was subsequently rewritten with 
strong U.S. government input.235 The outcome was a multi-million dollar per year aid 
package named Plan Colombia, which focused primarily on counter-drug efforts with a 
strong emphasis on eradication and interdiction.  
The plan approved by the U.S. had five stated goals to: (1) equip the police with 
30 Black Hawk and 18 Huey helicopters to be used solely for counternarcotics operations 
primarily in the southern part of the country; (2) provide local and regional radar facilities 
to strengthen interdiction capabilities; (3) expand the aerial spraying program with more  
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planes and basing facilities; (4) promote crop substitution; and (5) encourage reform to 
the justice system to decrease violence and increase the adherence to human rights 
laws.236 
After the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, closely followed by the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government eased 
many of the restrictions on Plan Colombia, which allowed for the use of funds for 
counterinsurgent operations. In addition, the United States also deployed the 7th Special 
Forces Group to train Colombian special operations units and increased the number of 
military advisors and contractors significantly. Nevertheless, the plan largely continued to 
ignore the social problems that permitted the situation to grow to its current levels.237 
Figure 9 shows U.S. aid to Colombia from 1997–2005 and clearly illustrates the U.S.‘s 
change of posture from counter-drug to counter-guerilla operations; but little remained 
allocated to addressing social problems. Uribe‘s plan would have to confront this portion 
with minimal foreign assistance. 
Since 2000, Colombia has received over $3.15 billion in U.S. aid for Plan 
Colombia with more than $4.3 billion allocated under the program‘s new name; the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).238 The fact that Colombia has only received 
$106 million in non-U.S. grant contributions raises the question of whether other nations 
have opted not to donate because the plan largely favors U.S. policy goals.239  
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Figure 9.   U.S. Aid to Colombia, 1997–2005.240 
5. Outcomes/Lessons Learned 
Three principle lessons can be derived from Colombia‘s experience prior to the 
election of President Uribe and the introduction of the Democratic Security and Defence 
Policy: (1) the GOC was following a U.S. backed policy counterdrug/interdiction strategy 
that failed to address the underlying issues adequately that allowed illicit activities to 
flourish; (2) while the GOC was following the U.S. backed strategy, they failed to 
implement policies aimed at reducing corruption and improving governance; and (3) 
GOC officials initially misread the problem as one of violence and failed to apply all the 
elements of national power against the problem. 
The U.S.‘s strategic goals in Colombia resulted from a failure by U.S. lawmakers 
to understand fully the problem at hand, or simply, the inclination to ignore the problem 
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and pursue self-seeking policies. U.S. lawmakers were focused on reducing drug flow to 
the United States and not Colombia‘s social ails, and thus, the focus was on counterdrug 
and interdiction operations. Likewise, Colombian lawmakers also had an unsound vision 
of the problem, which they viewed principally as one of violence. These problems were 
likely exacerbated by cartel and FARC influence on corrupt Colombian officials. 
Whatever the case may have been, improvements finally materialized when President 
Uribe, who dismissed the Colombian/American counterdrug/interdiction strategy and 
presented his DSDP, which placed the emphasis of the government‘s actions on 
protecting the people first and building from there. In other words, the government 
provides security, improved transparency, and legal alternatives to its population, while 
actively hunting down and eliminating nefarious groups. President Uribe understood that 
his forces already had legitimacy with the population; therefore, they needed to capitalize 
on the support of the population by giving them a central role in improving governance. 
This approach came largely in the form of creating non-corrupt local security forces and 
neighborhood watch programs vetted and funded by the government.241 The Center of 
Gravity analysis in the following section examines the two large cartels to support the 
claims made in this chapter that the root of the problem in Colombia was not a narcotics 
problem or a violence problem, but instead, the activities of the criminal organizations 
facilitated by corruption.  
E. CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS  
Examining past Colombian strategies toward reducing corruption and combating 
criminal organizations may provide useful insights that the Government of Mexico may 
be able to capitalize on in its struggle with corruption and drug cartels. While Colombia 
continues to struggle with drug production and smuggling at the hands of the cartelitos, 
the FARC (approaching its fifth decade in existence) and the paramilitary groups, the 
country has had many successes that merit analysis. A center of gravity (COG) analysis 
examines the GOC‘s campaign against the Medellín and Cali Cartel to extract exportable  
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lessons learned from those campaigns. Although not identical, the two large cartels 
operated in a similar fashion and for the purpose of conducting the (COG) analysis, is 
examined using the same criteria.  
1. Root of the Problem 
In their article, Linking Doctrine to Action: A New Coin Center-of-Gravity 
Analysis, Colonel Peter Mansoor and Major Mark Ulrich of the U.S. Marine Corps 
utilized a medical metaphor to describe the root cause of an insurgency. ―If the root cause 
of a problem is a wound, then an insurgency is the infection that emanates from the 
wound…therefore the counterinsurgent must treat the infection to heal the wound, but 
must also find and remove whatever caused the wound.‖242 This lesson on 
counterinsurgency can also be applied directly to the war on drugs and the cartels that 
traffic them.243  
Despite U.S. lawmakers‘ requests that the GOC view the drug trade as 
Colombia‘s COG,244 the GOC was more concerned with rising homicide rates and 
powerful cartels that threatened national security. Therefore, the GOC chose to focus its 
efforts on dismantling the cartels. While the GOC understood that the drug trade would 
be too difficult a target to go after directly, it wisely chose to exploit cartel vulnerabilities 
to defeat it and reduce violence. Although the illegal drug industry in Colombia has a 
long history, it did not gain notoriety until the drug cartels became so powerful that, 
instead of dodging the government as the minor drug producers had done in the 1950s 
and 1960s, they began directly confronting the government through either violence or 
corruption. The ideal scenario for a drug cartel or other criminal organization is a corrupt 
state in which they can operate freely; in Colombia, the big cartels used both corruption 
and violence to achieve their goals. In particular, the Medellin cartel conducted high 
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levels of indiscriminate violence and the Cali cartel capitalized on corrupt high-level 
officials. In spite of their efforts, the cartels‘ indiscriminant actions ultimately served to 
unite the country against them. 
Efforts to confront powerful drug cartels usually increase violence in the short 
term, particularly when the organization is decapitated. This is clearly evident today in 
Mexico and it was evident in Colombia in the 1990s, during which record levels of 
violence led up to and followed the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels.245 In 
addition to cartels‘ reprisal attacks against the government, inter and intra cartel violence 
represented the largest cause of homicide in Colombia. Figure 10 illustrates the history of 
violence in Colombia from 1960–2005. As seen, spikes in violence began in the late 
1970s during the establishment of the Medellín cartel and reached its highest levels near 
the time of Escobar‘s death in 1993. It took until 2005 for violence levels to drop to what 
they nearly were two decades earlier, which supported the claim that violence increases 
after cartel decapitations, or at least in the short term.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Homicide Rates in Colombia 1960–2005.246 
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2. Strengths and Weaknesses  
The GOC astutely determined that the drug cartels‘ COG was in fact the large 
profits of the illegal drug trade and not the drug trade itself. The critical capabilities of 
the drug cartels were examined to determine what actions or assets were absolutely 
critical to the survival of the drug cartels‘ profits. During this process, three critical 
capabilities stood out as most relevant to the operational capacity of the cartels, which 
were money laundering, drug trafficking and drug production. These activities were the 
principle profit-making activities of the cartels. Each of the previously mentioned critical 
capabilities had several critical requirements vital to their survival. Among these 
requirements were weak or corrupt law enforcement, corrupt government officials, front 
companies for laundering drug profits, drug distribution networks, a market demand for 
illegal drugs, chemicals required for the production of the drugs, and finally, the drug 
crops themselves. These critical requirements directly affected the capacity of the cartels 
to bribe public officials, command and control cartel operations, produce and distribute 
illicit drugs, safeguard the product while in production and during transit, and even 
recruit future cartel members.  
A COG‘s critical requirements are often vulnerable to direct or indirect attack, 
which are referred to as critical vulnerabilities because they possess the potential to 
produce decisive or significant effects on the COGs critical capabilities. Of the critical 
vulnerabilities identified, transparency focused on anti-corruption campaigns played the 
biggest role in weakening the ability of the cartels to conduct their operations. Coupled 
with anti-corruption measures, decisive operations by Colombia‘s security forces played 
a critical part in killing or capturing cartel leadership, as well as disrupting drug 
production and distribution efforts. President Uribe‘s DSDP reemphasized transparency 
and also focused on further improving governance and strengthening security. Figure 11 




Figure 11.   Colombia Drug Cartel COG Analysis. 
3. Government of Colombia’s Focus  
The GOC accurately recognized the need for international support to address its 
security problem.247 Support came primarily in the form of technological and operational 
assistance, which was the government‘s Achilles' heel. Fortunately, the United States 
provided Colombia with access to sophisticated electronic equipment that enhanced the 
GOC‘s eavesdropping capabilities for monitoring cartel communications and activities, 
as well as U.S. Special Operations Forces to offer critically needed counter-terrorist 
training and advisory support. This assistance was provided directly to the Colombian 
National Police and Colombian military. In addition, the Colombian government 
increased salaries for security personnel and instituted strong vetting procedures for their 
forces that included polygraph tests to ensure intelligence was not leaked, which allowed 
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the government to arrest the Cali cartel‘s leadership, and thus, successfully dismantle that 
cartel only three years after killing Pablo Escobar and taking down the Medellín cartel.  
4. Outcome 
While the destruction of the two large cartels in the 1990s was viewed as a 
success, it did not end the violence or drug trafficking as many had hoped; instead, it 
created new challenges because the root problem of corruption and poor security had not 
been addressed. While the country had rid itself of a giant threat to its security, the rise of 
the ―cartelitos,‖ along with the massive growth of the FARC emboldened by drug profits, 
soon proved that more was needed than simply taking down the two big cartels. The 
GOC‘s obsession with dismantling the cartels, but not addressing the conditions that had 
allowed the drug trade to flourish, would need to be addressed with a comprehensive 
strategy.248 The results of this miscalculation would prove deadly when only three years 
after the death of Pablo Escobar, the GOC would find itself up against an insurgency that 
had crossed the threshold to Phase II of Mao‘s people‘s war model—conventional 
warfare against the government.249 Eventually, Uribe‘s WoG approach would put the 
country on a path towards increased security.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Although Colombia is still struggling with cartelitos, insurgent groups and 
paramilitaries involved in the drug trade in some form or another, the country‘s successes 
dismantling the cartels during the 1990s and reducing corruption and improving 
governance under the Democratic Security and Defence Policy, serve as a success story 
in the fight against organized crime.  
It is important to note that the destruction of the two largest cartels pushed the 
transportation and distribution share of the drug trafficking business—undoubtedly the 
most profitable portion of the business—into the hands of Mexico‘s cartels. Therefore, it 
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is imperative to remember that taking down large criminal organizations does not defeat 
the root of the problem—the culture of corruption directly responsible for the industry‘s 
success. Figure 12 depicts the common trafficking routes and corridors as of 2008, as 
well as the world‘s largest consumers of cocaine. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Global Cocaine Flows As of 2008.250 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The circumstances faced by the Government of Mexico today is in many ways 
similar to that faced by the Government of Colombia 20 years ago; powerful drug cartels 
challenging the state‘s authority, widespread government corruption, and a general 
mistrust of the government by the population. Nevertheless, in less than 10 years, the 
GOC was able to dismantle both of its large cartels and significantly reduce the murder 
rate from a high of nearly 80 per 100,000 people in 1990 to fewer than 40 per 100,000 by 
early 2005.251 Mexico‘s murder rate, by contrast, stands at 18.4 per 100,000 when last 
reported by the GOM in January 2011.252 While this thesis does not profess that 
Colombia is a flawless example of how to conduct counter-drug or counter-cartel 
operations, it did achieve numerous successes against the nefarious groups operating 
within its borders. These successes were possible in part due to the clear strategy 
implemented by the GOC that included rooting out corruption and professionalizing its 
security forces, building a strong and capable police force, close military to military 
cooperation with the United States, and ruthlessly targeting nefarious groups.  
Similarly, Mexico has been plagued by increasing violence attributed to drug 
cartels attempting to maintain control of the drug trafficking trade within the country. The 
high degree of influence wielded by the Mexican cartels has become the center of gravity 
for the international drug trade since the demise of the Colombian cartels in the 1990s. In 
addition to inter-cartel rival violence, fractures among cartel leadership, exacerbated by 
the increasing pressure applied by the GOM, have also led to significant increases in 
intra-cartel violence. All the same, despite the considerable amount of firepower being 
brought to bear on the cartels by the GOM, violence or cartel activities have yet to exhibit 
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any sign of slowing down. This reality proves that the GOM‘s current strategy of 
principally targeting the cartels and their illicit activities is ineffective, inefficient, and 
requires reconsideration. A new strategy is needed that effectively targets the center of 
gravity—the cartels‘ influence and the corrupt environment that allows them to thrive.  
B. APPLICABILITY OF COLOMBIAN LESSONS TO MEXICO 
Building on the case studies of Colombia and Mexico, this chapter highlights 
shared problems in both countries and identify which applicable lessons can be drawn 
from Colombia and applied to Mexico. As is highlighted, Colombia‘s root issues were 
very different from those in Mexico today; however, the corollary was strikingly similar. 
For instance, unlike Colombia, the GOM is not currently wrestling with insurgent and 
paramilitary groups that obtain funding largely from the illegal drug trade. Despite these 
intrinsic differences, there are still valuable lessons to be learned from Colombia‘s 
successes and failures. 
Having identified the COG of Mexico‘s cartels as influence, facilitated 
specifically by corruption, similarities between the Colombian and the Mexican problems 
become evident. Corruption is the critical capability that facilitates organized crime and 
as such must be addressed. The GOC did not experience real gains in their fight against 
organized crime until it addressed corruption and its ramifications on society.  
1. Corruption Lessons from Colombia 
In 1998, Colombia‘s Corruption Perceptions Index score was 2.2 out of 10 and 
ranked 79 out of 85 countries polled (bottom 7%). By 2010, Colombia‘s CPI score had 
risen to 3.5, and ranked 78 out of 178 countries, (top 44%). Colombia‘s index score 
experienced marked increases during the time period following the decapitations of the 
Cali and Medellín cartels.253 The increase is attributed to improved confidence in the 
government because of better policing, military and political reform, international 
cooperation, and a strong effort made towards enhancing citizen security as seen by 
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President Uribe‘s initiation of a Whole of Government (WoG) approach. President 
Uribe‘s changes to national security policies, including the professionalization of the 
military and law enforcement, as well as institutional reforms throughout the government, 
has aided greatly in Colombia‘s progress towards becoming more transparent. One 
noteworthy measure of reform implemented in the Colombian law enforcement agencies 
and military was the ousting of corrupt anti-drug officials. The introduction of well-paid 
and vetted personnel, along with the recruitment and employment of large numbers of 
paid civilian informants, had an immeasurable effect on preventing future corruption. 
These changes accomplished three important goals: purged the Colombian anti-drug 
initiatives of corrupt drug agents, amplified public trust by increasing transparency, and 
further swayed public support from criminal organizations to the state.254  
Also beneficial to Colombia‘s fight against the cartels was a close relationship 
with the United States. For nearly 30 years, the United States has provided large amounts 
of military supplies and other funding aid to Colombia to build its capacity to take the 
fight to the cartels and other groups. Military training and advising in particular have 
been invaluable for professionalizing Colombian security forces, building their special 
operations capacity and improving their capability to confront their internal threats.255 
While the close relationship with the United States provided Colombia much of the 
necessary technical and operational assistance lacking, it was also at times 
counterproductive. For example, U.S. political pressure in the 1980s led Colombia 
initially to implement ineffective anti-drug policies that focused on the drug supply and 
not the underlying social problems. The result of this misapplied policy was a splintered 
drug trade after the dismantling of the big cartels and redistribution of the drug trade 
between the insurgent groups, paramilitaries and the cartelitos. These errors were 
corrected later and the GOC readjusted its strategy. However, the experience  
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demonstrates that, at the time, neither Colombia nor the United States had placed enough 
priority on addressing the root cause of the drug trade, which in turn, allowed the 
splintering of the drug trade.256  
2. Mexico Applicability 
As compared to Colombia, Mexico has moved downward on the CPI charts. It 
dropped from a 3.3 index score and a rank of 55 out of 85 countries polled in 1998 (top 
35%), down to a 3.1 index score and 98 out of 178 countries polled in 2010 (bottom 
45%). Mexico has attempted to reform its police forces once, in 2000, when President 
Fox restructured the Federal Judicial Police, but that attempt was unsuccessful largely 
because corrupted officials were replaced with more corrupt officials. In 2010, President 
Calderón stated that he intended to begin shifting Mexico‘s local police into a nationally 
unified police force in hopes of greatly reducing corruption levels. This reform, however, 
has yet to be implemented and will take a considerable amount of time and management 
to develop before changes are visible.  
Another challenge facing Mexico is its limited but improving relationship with 
neighboring countries that share its cartel problems. Cartel operations routinely spill over 
Mexico‘s borders into the United States, Guatemala, Belize and other nations. In 
addition, the GOM only permits small numbers of U.S. military forces to provide military 
assistance or training on Mexican territory and then heavily limit what those forces are 
permitted to do. This restriction is the result of ingrained perceptions of the United States 
meddling in Mexican domestic affairs and suspicion over U.S. intentions.257 This 
suspicion has precluded the United States from providing very useful operational 
assistance on the ground with the Mexicans.  
On an equally frustrating note, U.S. financial aid provided to Mexico comes with 
many earmarks dictating it can purchase, as well as the allowable uses of the equipment. 
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Even more similar to the Colombia case is that minimal amounts of aid (less than $75 
million) has been earmarked for social reforms aimed at curbing corruption or providing 
alternative economic alternatives to the poor.258 As with Plan Colombia, by not 
addressing the primary issues facing Mexico—corruption—the Mérida Initiative is not 
effectively addressing the cartel COG. For example, in 1991, a report prepared by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office offered evidence that eradication and counter-
drug operations alone do not reduce drug production or trafficking. The report showed 
that two years of extensive eradication efforts in Colombia using herbicide spraying did 
not reduce the production of coca; instead, it increased by 50%.259 While cartels may 
initially be weakened by government operations, they are able to quickly regroup or 
splinter into alternative cartels because the root causes have not been addressed.  
C. WAY AHEAD 
Despite multi-million dollar efforts by both Mexico and the United States, 
competing drug cartels, illegal arms sales, human trafficking, corrupt government 
officials and law enforcement, non-responsive GOM agencies, and ever-increasing levels 
of violence continue to play a significant role in Mexican instability. Of these issues, 
corruption has undoubtedly played the largest role in creating space for illicit and illegal 
activities to flourish, and has gone largely unaddressed. A report published in December 
2009 by Transparency International (TI) showed that the GOM had failed to capitalize on 
anti-corruption efforts initiated under former Mexican President Fox beginning in 2000. 
The director of TI‘s Mexican affiliate, Tranparencia Mexicana, Eduardo Bohorquez, 
emphasized that while the GOM has made numerous strides in improving transparency, 
―it has not moved to the second phase, which is effective accountability and coordination  
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of national agencies with local laws.‖260 A new way ahead that places reform at the 
forefront is critical to addressing the problems of corruption effectively, and ultimately, 
the unsuccessful government policies incapable of defeating the cartels. 
1. Reform 
In his book, The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency, Seth Jones argues that ―the 
Afghanistan government‘s inability to provide basic services and establish law and order‖ 
was largely to blame for the rise of the Taliban insurgency.261 Using Dr. Jones‘s theory, 
similarly, it could be argued that criminal organizations, such as drug cartels, flourish 
because of corrupt law enforcement and public officials that either tolerate or do not have 
the power to prevent illicit activities. In addition, the GOM has failed to provide ample 
opportunities for its citizens to live fulfilling lives without having to resort to illegal 
activities. While there always will be a small percentage of any population that will 
embrace a nefarious lifestyle regardless of the opportunities afforded, this percentage 
would be minimal and manageable from a law enforcement standpoint.  
For the GOM to retake control of areas controlled by the cartels successfully and 
begin to shift the population that supports the cartels towards legitimate lifestyles, it must 
first create an environment in which the population feels that they and their children have 
a stake in the future of their nation. A state‘s failure or inability to create and maintain 
that bond with its citizens ultimately results in a loss of trust between the people and their 
government.262 In the case of Colombia, President Uribe‘s WoG approach provides a 
strong foundation for how to approach this problem because of the importance it places 
on re-establishing security, providing economic opportunity and gaining the trust of the 
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population.263 As mentioned in the Colombian case study, ―the strengthening of the rule 
of law is the essential prerequisite to achieving the aim of Democratic Security: the 
protection of each and every citizen…a fundamental prerequisite to effective rule of law 
is the lack of rampant corruption.‖264 In the parts of Mexico controlled by cartels, the 
cartel members make the rules, not the state. Therefore, the citizen does not have the 
luxury of rejecting demands made by cartel members; whom would they turn to if they 
did? For this reason, a strong, non-corrupt and effective government is absolutely critical. 
Just as the state depends on the citizens to live within the limits of the law, the citizens 
need the guarantee of safety and security.  
2. Implementation 
Many members of the GOM, such as Mexican Attorney General Eduardo 
Medina-Mora, believed the solution to police corruption was as simple as purging the 
forces of corrupt officers and hiring new officers.265 Initial attempts at purging the forces 
of corrupt officers proved unsuccessful because the root causes of the corruption were not 
addressed: low police salaries, high risk when operating against cartel members, 
inadequate personal protection equipment, and little to no state back up. To illustrate, 
Reuters news agency reported in 2007 that on average, ―Mexican police officers earn 
$375 a month, well below the $660 that even the GOM says is just enough for officers to 
feed their families and cover basic needs. Furthermore, in some small border towns, 
officers receive as little as $300 a month, have threadbare uniforms, worn-out pistols and 
are expected to buy their own bullets.‖266 Add to this quandary a weak and corrupted  
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justice system and it becomes clear why Mexican police officers accept bribes from cartel 
members or resign as many honest officers do when faced with real life threats of 
violence from better-armed and equipped cartel members.  
The GOM must do away with the hundreds of state and local police departments, 
and invest heavily in a strong, capable, vetted and well-paid National Police Force similar 
to Colombia‘s. As was the case in Colombia, the effort to reform the police must come 
from within the ranks, as a patriotic movement from respected Mexican officers. The 
outcome must be a professional and respectable force that truly wants to serve and protect 
its citizens, and not its own selfish desires. Mexican citizens want a dependable and non-
corrupt police force and should receive nothing less. The GOM‘s attempts to weed out 
corruption until now have been ineffective because officials who refused to be corrupted 
or spoke out against it were quickly assassinated.267 Officials need better security to 
speak out and act against corruption without the fear of violence against them or their 
loved ones. The GOM must provide this.  
Mexico has also made positive strides towards providing their officers superior 
training by sending police officers to Colombia to receive specialized paramilitary/anti-
terror training.268 Colombia, because of its long history fighting powerful cartels, as well 
as insurgent and paramilitary groups, is in a unique position to provide the specialized 
training the Mexican‘s need. However, the United States remains the much better choice 
to provide the training due to its technical expertise and availability of funding for 
equipment that the GOM needs to produce a capable, well-trained and dependable police 
force.  
3. The Need for a Strong International Partnership 
As GOM anti-cartel efforts continue to provide mixed results at best, the need to 
build a cooperative capacity to fight corruption and break the perpetual cycle of illegal 
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activity has become apparent. In particular, Mexico must design closer working 
relationships with other countries either sharing its problems or that have experience 
confronting these sorts of issues. The example mentioned previously about cooperation 
with Colombia provides an excellent starting point. The cooperation currently occurring 
is with Colombia's elite Jungla or Jungle Unit that has been providing tactical training to 
Mexican police in Colombia. The courses are four months long and provide the Mexican 
officers with training in the use of explosives, assault rifles, jungle tactics and how to 
perform raids on heavily fortified compounds.269 During an interview with the United 
Press International (UPI), Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos stated, ―Mexico has 
what we had some years ago, which are very powerful cartels…what we can provide is 
the experience that we have had dismantling those cartels, training intelligence officers, 
and training judicial police.‖270 
During a visit to Mexico in January 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
stressed the co-responsibility of the United States for Mexico‘s drug problems given its 
position as the largest consumer of illegal drugs and other illicit activities.271 However, 
despite more than $400 million dollars in Mérida initiative funding provided to the GOM, 
almost all of it has been spent on military equipment and not addressing the root causes 
of the problem, such as corruption and poor social programs.272 To date, less than $75 
million has been applied towards social programs, which would aim to improve the lives 
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positive result of the initiative thus far have been several high-level arrests and killings of 
drug cartel leaders; more often than not, at the hands of the Mexican military and not the 
police due to high levels of corruption within the police.274  
With the assistance of the United States, the GOM could establish a strong anti-
corruption task force that would target the nexus between the cartels and corrupt GOM 
agencies. All task force members would be subject to rigorous vetting procedures to 
include random polygraph examinations, continual background investigations and new 
and improved training. This endeavor would utilize a combined military/law enforcement 
and interagency approach. The unity of effort would concentrate on different approaches 
to the same goal. U.S. assistance to train the Mexican Task Force and share ideas would 
enhance an appropriate response to criminal events.  
The use of technology is also important in the fight against the cartels as was 
witnessed by the GOC‘s establishment of a shared database to track the shipments of the 
precursor chemicals required to produce cocaine from the countries in which they are 
manufactured. This database allowed the GOC to disrupt the cocaine manufacturing 
process. A similar database could be created to track and disrupt the flow of the drug 
pseudoephedrine into Mexico, which is used to make methamphetamine.275 Before this 
could be effective, Mexican customs must be reformed and purged of corrupt officials. 
The use of technology, while important in the fight against the cartels, is not the 
absolute solution. The GOM must also create and implement a strong Internal Affairs 
(IA) department within its government, judiciary, military and law enforcement agencies 
that would monitor personnel with the primary goal of minimizing instances of future 
corruption. The implementation of this new IA unit would come with considerable costs 
to the GOM in the form of both finances and personnel that have not been corrupted.  
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With new personnel manning both the IA department and other law enforcement 
agencies, the GOM stands a much stronger chance than it does today of defeating the 
cartels.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Transparency International‘s President Huguette Labelle maintains, ―countries 
can control the growth of corruption by strengthening their legislative and judicial 
branches, promoting strong and independent auditing agencies, and devoting adequate 
resources to combating illegal activities.‖276 In Mexico today, the military is taking the 
lead in the war against the drug cartels. It is doing so out of sheer necessity because of the 
unreliable and corrupt police forces, but it is a stopgap solution. The country desperately 
needs to reform and overhaul its hundreds of separate state and municipal police forces. It 
will most likely be several more years before the Mexican Federal Police is strong 
enough to take over this war from the army, perhaps even then, the military will likely 
have to assist the police in confronting heavily armed paramilitary units of the cartels. As 
Washington sends money south as part of the Mérida Initiative to combat crime and drug 
trafficking in Mexico, it must be careful not to focus too much on military assistance and 
neglect other, more effective forms of aid essential to success, such as training, the 
creation of transparent institutions and a wider perspective on the problem.  
In Colombia, nearly all of the initial U.S. aid in the 1980s came in the form of 
military equipment, which gave the Colombian government the erroneous impression that 
the cartels could be destroyed using military force alone. The United States has thus far 
made the same mistake in Mexico. Virtually all of the first $300 million of Mérida 
funding—25 percent of the total so far—went to military equipment.277 Some of this 
equipment is useful, of course, but it is more important in the long run for the United 
States to concentrate its assistance on the development, training, and professionalization 
of Mexico‘s law enforcement officers. Mexico needs new police officers paid well 
enough to make them less susceptible to bribery. The best solution may be to abolish the 
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municipal police departments altogether and have reformed state police agencies, 
comprised of officers trained at a national police academy, take over policing in the 
cities. Only with these rigorous and comprehensive changes can the wider problem of 
corruption be addressed, which is the environment that allows the cartels to flourish.  
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